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ABSTRACT
Self-interest, National Interest and the Political Leader's
Responsibility
Joe Gumiensky
The two major schools of thought on international 
relations in the United States are the realists and the 
internationalists (often called Utopians). Both have a long 
history in Anglo-American thinking on foreign affairs but the 
internationalists have taken a back seat to the realists since 
World War II. Internationalists have called for international 
cooperation in the interests of humanity while the realists 
have emphasized self-interest and national power. An 
examination of the formation of the Panama Canal Treaties 
shows that neither school is adequate in explaining how 
national interest is defined. Instead, national interest is 
the result of a more complex political process.
According to Aristotle, the supreme virtue of a political 
leader is prudence. Diplomatic prudence addresses political 
complexity, because it is a thoughtful balance of the moral 
and strategic goals of the statesman. The author examines the 
notion of prudence and its application to international 
relations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Those who delve into the literature on international 
relations encounter writings that differ in their approach and 
prescription. National interest is the common thread that 
runs throughout these debates, along with the eternal dispute 
over whether ideals or selfish interests should shape American 
foreign policy. Of course, the choices are rarely posed so 
starkly and alternatives are not presented as mutually 
exclusive. Still, these alternatives have served as polar 
positions around which people tend to gravitate. Comparison 
of the two positions results in a steady stream of rebuttal 
and counterargument in a series of inconclusive exchanges and 
does little to advance the understanding of national interest 
or how it should be used to formulate policy.
This thesis acknowledges the connection between national 
interest and politics, ideas and values. In Chapter 2, the 
notion of national interest is examined as well as the realist 
and utopian points of view of American foreign policy. 
Chapter 3, contends that the output of a process that is made 
of the aforementioned components does not lend itself to a 
neat and comprehensive definition of the 'national interest.' 
The political leader should therefore acknowledge the complex 
mixture of ingredients that make up national interest and
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exercise the virtue of prudence in the spirit of Aristotle. 
The political leader who cultivates this virtue will move out 
of his role as a conflict mediator to a more fundamental role 
of helping citizens realize their fullest potential. A case 
study examining the development of the Panama Canal Treaties 
is presented in Chapter 4 to show the complex nature of 
foreign affairs and how a specific foreign policy evolved and 
responded over a 70 year period to the changing configuration 
of domestic and international interests. Finally, the notion 
of prudence is examined in light of the Canal Treaties and 
recommendations for statesmen are provided.
CHAPTER 2
NATIONAL INTEREST AND SELF-INTEREST 
National Interest
Perhaps the most readily accepted tenet of the American 
foreign policy establishment is that reflection on available 
resources leads to a recognition that power, though limited, 
is necessary to achieve foreign policy goals. The statesman 
must abandon those ends for which power is missing or unusable 
and preserve and increase power for those ends determined as 
indispensable. Kenneth Thompson defines national interest as 
a given set of needs and requirements that lie at the root of 
the survival of every political group.1 Constraining the 
fulfillment of these needs and requirements are the nation's 
resources and its national capacity which require statesmen to 
choose the most effective of several actions.
The question for political leaders is how to best 
determine national interest and develop policies that promote 
it. Oppenheim attempts to distill a definition of national 
interest. He focuses on the state's security, economic well­
being, territory, and independence as a whole, and not of a 
particular individual or groups within a state. Excluded from 
his notion of national interest are values held by "some,
1 Kenneth W. Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1980), 18.
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many, and perhaps all members of a given society."2 For him, 
there is an underlying assumption that it is possible, at
least in principle, to determine the national interest by
objective criteria.3 Joynt and Corbett correctly counter 
Oppenheim, showing the objectives of states are various and 
complex - security, prestige, prosperity, liberty and so on. 
They, too, argue that conflicts are common because of scarce 
resources. The allocations of these resources will vary and 
will be a function of the ethical values of decision-makers 
combined with estimates of the nature and extent of
international dangers and opportunities.4
As the above debate shows, national interest is a vague 
as well as a controversial term. But when used as an
instrument of political action, the expression serves as a 
means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies.5 The 
term "national" can be misleading, for example, when applied 
to a people such as the Kurds or the Palestinians because they 
have no national sovereignty but do share a common heritage 
and a sense of being a nation. This "political socialization"
2 Felix E. Oppenheim, "National Interest, Rationality, 
and Morality" Political Theory (August 1987): 370.
3 Felix E. Oppenheim, The Place of Morality in Foreign 
Policy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), 12.
4 Carey B. Joynt and Percy E. Corbett, Theory and Reality 
in World Politics (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), 9.
5 James N. Rosenau, "National Interest", International 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 1968, quoted in Joseph 
Frankel, National Interest, (Praeger Publishers, 1970), 16.
implies that people receive politically-oriented education 
that encompasses inculcation of political information, values 
and practices. On the international level, national interest 
is the conglomerate of human attitudes and behavior with high 
priority on the defense and assertion of the values, 
interests, and the institutions of a particular people usually 
defined in terms of such common traits as culture, ethnicity, 
or ideology.6
Broad domestic policies such as health reform are 
sometimes referred to as in the "national interest"; the term 
'public interest' may be more appropriate in these cases 
because of their internal nature. For this thesis, national 
interest will be limited to the actions, interactions and 
external interests of existing states on the international 
level. External interests refer to the interests of a unitary 
actor as it relates to other unitary actors that are states. 
Even with this clarification, national interest is still a 
clouded term. If policy makers could declare a certain course 
of actions to be in the national interest and by mere 
declaration it was so, then it would be impossible to act 
contrary to national interest.
National interest is difficult to directly define, and I 
believe that it is impossible to conceive of national interest 
in terms outside the political process. As we shall later
6 Barrie Stacey, Political Socialization in Western 
Society (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978) 3, 45.
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see, a state's national interest and its foreign policies will 
be influenced by ideas, internal and external politics, and 
circumstances.
Self-interest and Political Thought
The concept of national interest, for some, is based on 
the concept of individual human self-interest. Plato's rivals 
argued that human beings came together in political 
association for the narrow reason of balancing mutual fear 
with safety. They believed that human nature was self- 
centered and thus grounded their theory of political life for 
apolitical man.7 During the time Christianity dominated 
Western thought, the notion of self-interest-based behavior 
was thought as evidence of sin and not as a foundation of 
potential political order. Christianity developed a notion of 
an intangible, eternal soul within us and for many people this 
soul was more real than their own flesh and blood. Late 
Medieval Christian thought was characterized by the synthesis 
of Aristotelian and Augustinian thought developed by St. 
Thomas Aquinas. Western political thinkers influenced by the 
Christian tradition have often aspired to universal moral 
codes that have the tendency to abstract from certain 
contingent factors of social relations, as if entirely removed 
from all contingency.
7 Plato, The Republic, trans. Benjamin Jowett, (New York: 
Airmont, 1986), 358E - 359B.
Renaissance humanism rekindled the classical notion that 
humans were responsible and rational. Da Vinci, Copernicus, 
Kepler and Galileo developed the natural sciences with their 
stress on observation and mathematics. The new science 
secularized human knowledge and established that human reason 
was competent to fashion fundamental laws of the universe. 
This reasoning eventually carried through to political 
science, law, psychology, economics and ethics.
In England, contract theory that reflected a competitive 
individualism developed for the preservation of property and 
the enforcement of justice. Morality had been thoroughly 
secularized and "the good" was no longer an intrinsic source 
of attraction. Thomas Hobbes drew an analogy between human 
nature and the discoveries of Renaissance physics which 
replaced the Aristotelian telos with unending motion. 
Aristotle had argued that all human activity has a purpose, a 
function. According to Hobbes, the human "appetite" is for 
things that help us survive, and human "aversion" is for 
things that threaten. Good and evil are similarly defined. 
Hobbes, using Galileo's work in dynamics, the science of 
moving bodies that states objects never stop once set in 
motion, suggested that people, like objects, will interact 
when they come into contact. He saw no remedy for conflict 
between nations in the absence of power to enforce peace and 
agreements. In Hobbes' "state of nature" every man had an 
unlimited right to everything, so there was no justice or
8
injustice, and self-preservation was the only rule. From this 
universal structural position of vulnerability and initial 
equality, Hobbes proposed that survival depended on submission 
to a superordinate authority, the sovereign. He thought 
awareness of the vulnerability of men would bring them to seek 
peace and to pledge against violence. In this state or 
commonwealth, people relinquish a part of their unlimited 
rights on the condition that others do so as well. This 
contract with others bonds political society and produces 
civic morality. Third-party control was an effective way for 
rational self-interested individuals to produce collective 
outcomes that were not favoring some individuals' interests 
above others. Hobbes was emulated by some but attacked by 
many, especially church-minded Royalists. Many also 
recognized the importance of issues he had raised: the
arbitrary and conventional character of morality, its 
embodiment in the social contract, and the character of 
popular consent.8
In political science, a theory of "adversary” democracy 
founded on both conflict and self-interest has been evolving 
since the seventeenth century. This theory incorporated a 
legitimate role for self-interest in the polity. The new 
argument justified the vote as a means of protecting one's 
interests. Cromwell's Long Parliament witnessed the departing
8 Abraham Edel et al., Morality, Philosophy, and Practice 
(New York: Random House, 1989), 179.
from a tradition that consensus seeking was the best way to 
ascertain the good of the whole, and made the first step 
toward the claim (by now a full-fledged adversary theory) that 
moral neutrality existed between one set of interests and 
another.9 Mansbridge posits that the adversary theory rests 
on the idea that man is asocial because the pursuit of power 
and self-interest will eventually lead to clashes. As 
Mansbridge explains it, this model of democracy reduced human 
motivation to self-interest with no moral dimension. In other 
words, a community is not a place where friends come together 
to seek the good life, but a process through which each person 
seeks his or her own particular good.10 But Tong argues that 
even if the processes of conflict-oriented politics such as 
bargaining, adapting and compromising do not have the 
community's interest in mind, the theory has a moral dimension 
insofar as it requires the acceptance of consequences and the 
ascription of responsibility.11
Adam Smith felt that a nonrational element, "the 
invisible hand" (i.e. the market), was needed to guide selfish 
men to the general good as outlined in Wealth of Nations in
9 Mark Kishlansky, "The Emergence of Adversary Politics 
in the Long Parliament," Journal of Modern History 49: 618.
10 Jane J. Mansbridge, "Self-interest in the Explanation 
of Political Life," Beyond Self Interest, ed. Jane J. 
Mansbridge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 
6 .
11 Rosemarie Tong, Ethics in Policy Analysis, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986), 45.
1776. Smith and other champions of free trade attempted to 
promote their point of view as a method of world-wide 
harmony.12 Many thought that free trade was the "international 
law of the almighty" and free trade and peace were one and the 
same. In America, the framers of the Constitution wrestled 
with the constant danger of corruption from self-interest 
while they tried to rally the public spirit. John Adams held 
that self-deceit was the "spurious offspring of self-love" and 
was the root cause of the ease with which men attack one 
another, all the while mistaking the impulses of their own 
"swarms of passions" for the dictates of conscience. Hamilton 
worried about men obsessed with self-promotion.13 Madison's 
constitutional proposals always had two prongs: one based on 
using self-interest and one on repressing it.14
For some, the effort to expand social welfare within the 
framework of liberalism in the eighteenth century would 
reconstruct the classic communitarian model of social 
interaction. The symbols of liberalism were constitutions, 
parliament, representative government, individual liberty,
12 Kenneth Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1980), 155. Also see Frances 
Moore Lappe, Rediscovering America's Values, (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1989), 12.
13 Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1987), 21, 212.
14 Jane Mansbridge, "Self-interest in the Explanation of 
Political Life" Beyond Self Interest, ed. Jane Mansbridge 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 7.
rule of law, and rights of man which displaced the symbols of 
authoritarianism, monarchism, and despotism. Free elections 
replaced mixtures of ascription, conspiracy, mob endorsement 
and brute force. Liberalism preferred political styles such 
as dialogue, debate, deliberation and compromise 
majoritarianism instead of decision making by cabal and rule 
by executive decree. During this period, analysis-as-argument 
was introduced as part of the democratic system as we know it 
today. This process raises relevant issues, probes 
assumptions, stimulates debate and educates citizens. The 
winners of the debate are exposed to the same forces over and 
over again. Kant believed that as the number of states based 
on liberal principles grew, people would progress and 
gradually come closer together toward a greater agreement on 
the basis for peace and understanding.15 Organizations to 
control the international use of force did develop in 1918 
(the League of Nations), but national governments were, 
however, unwilling to accept limitations upon state 
sovereignty (self-interest) to endow the collective security 
organization with the authority and ability to make it 
successful. The League of Nations dissolved before the second 
world war; its successor was the United Nations which had a 
charter that promised to correct major weaknesses of the
15 Immanuel Kant, "Eternal Peace", in Carl Joachim 
Friedrich, Inevitable Peace, (New York: Greenwood Press,
1948), 256.
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League. The difference between the old League of Nations and 
the new United Nations was that the latter established a 
global power structure and that collective security would be 
enforced by the four Great Powers acting in concert as the 
"Four Policemen." The problem though, in addition to Great 
Britain's weakness, was that not all foreign leaders, 
especially Stalin, saw international politics through the lens 
of a similar moral or empirical framework.
Early in the twentieth century dominant political thought 
moved away from the dual approach combining interests and the 
common good, and by the 1930s New Deal intellectuals struck 
out against "moralists" and shifted toward a more hard-boiled, 
detached approach. Realism, as it became known, developed a 
political science theory based on conflicting self-interests. 
After World War II the descriptive theory of adversary 
democracy developed, grounding government totally in self- 
interest. The concept of majority rule as a measure of good 
of the whole changed to an approach to sum competing 
individual preferences. In an atmosphere where interests of 
citizens diverged and a unanimous citizenry was untenable, 
adversary democracy allowed the modern democratic nation-state 
to flourish. The new concept did not require people to be 
correct or moral but placed a burden upon them to promote 
their interests while not expecting them to resolve underlying
13
conflicts.16
The theory also had a normative side. The theory is only 
legitimated when each individual's interests are weighted 
equally, by accepting the moral worth of each individual's 
interests and by the notion that all interests deserve equal 
weight. For this theory to be fully operational citizens must 
have access to the political system and choose to exercise it.
Self-interest and International Relations
The concept of self-interest has also prevailed in United 
States international relations since World War II in the 
realist tradition. In this tradition, egoistic assumptions 
dominate over the humanist interests of idealism. Within this 
framework, Hans J. Morgenthau argued in Politics Among Nations 
that power is the "immediate aim" of countries in foreign 
relationships. Power to Morgenthau was "man's control over 
the minds and actions of other men...[as] a psychological 
relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it 
is exercised."17
Two schools of thought make up the long-standing debate 
on the role of self-interest in international relations. This 
debate has been conducted in many different terms. The
16 Jane Mansbridge, "Self-interest in the Explanation of 
Political Life" Beyond Self Interest, ed. Jane Mansbridge 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 8.
17 Hans J. Morgenthau quoted by Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A 
History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), 225.
14
predominant realist theory, sometimes called the 
consequentialist theory, is pitted against the opposite side, 
who usually refer to themselves as internationalists. Other 
names for the internationalists (usually used by the realists) 
include idealist, utopian, and deontologist. The two sides 
describe each other in various ways. The following are some 
examples:
James Schlesinger - "[One side] tend[s] to be rather 
romantic. [To them] the world seems a benign place, with 
a natural harmony among peoples only intermittently 
disrupted by evil men or hostile ideologies... [The 
other side has] far tougher attitudes... hardened by 
centuries of conflict, defeat, suppression, and national 
humiliation. [To them the world] is marked by power 
politics, national rivalries, and ethnic tensions."18
Robert G. Kaufman - "Realists... [argue] that U.S. 
foreign policy should not give prominence either to the 
promotion of human rights or to democracy... 
Internationalists... believe that promoting and 
maintaining democracy abroad will remain vital to 
national interests... .".19
Colin S. Gray - "One coalition of beliefs may be labeled 
the consequentialists, the other the absolute or 
deontological. The former coalition holds that the 
dominant ethical argument over a policy must pertain to
18 James Schlesinger, "The New World Order, A Plea for 
Realism," Foreign Policy, No. 85, Winter 1991-92: 3.
19 Robert G. Kaufman, "Morality and World Affairs, 
Avoiding Utopianism," Strategic Review, Spring 1992: 31.
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its actual consequences. The latter coalition of 
beliefs... adheres to an absolute ethic that purportedly 
should govern behavior.20
Robert W. McElroy - "The realist tradition... stresses 
the roles of necessity and anarchy in the politics of 
nations... . [It leaves] little room for meaningful 
choice on the part of state decision makers, and even 
less room for meaningful choice of moral values that 
conflict with the national interest...The 
internationalists believed firmly in the notion of human 
progress....[They believe] human beings in all parts of 
the world share a destiny that is increasingly 
interconnected on the economic, political, cultural, and 
technological planes."21
Thompson explains the contrast in diplomatic terms.22 He 
compares two approaches to diplomacy as: the warrior-heroic 
and the mercantile-shopkeeper models. The first resembles a 
military campaign with aggressive tactics and without the 
pursuit of trust or fairness. The mercantile-shopkeeper model 
is based on compromise emphasizing mutual understanding and 
honesty.
McElroy contrasts these two tendencies as different views
20 Colin S. Gray, "Force, Order, and Justice: The Ethics 
of Realism," Global Affairs, Summer Issue 1993: 21.
21 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and Foreign Policy, 
(Princeton University Press, 1992), 1-7.
22 Kenneth W. Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 12.
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of human nature. He explains that liberal internationalist 
thought dominated the field of international relations from 
1918 to 1945, the interwar period.23 World War I and the 
cataclysmic events surrounding it were seen as the ultimate 
indictment of the power politics that governed Europe. The 
internationalists saw the opportunity to transform politics 
among nations into a more cooperative and transnational 
process to create a stable, peaceful era. They believed that 
war arose not from the nature of man "but rather from patterns 
of state interaction that could be altered through moral 
education and the collective action of the peoples of the 
world."24 The internationalists saw how terribly under­
equipped the Allied statesmen were to deal with the tangled 
problems that victory had left at their doorstep. They 
realized the vast distance that separated popular expectations 
from practical realities and how important it was for the 
future peace of humankind that judgement on foreign affairs 
should be formulated on a basis of widely shared expert 
knowledge. They emphasized the common interest all nations 
had in preserving peace and creating a stable international 
order. Common to the internationalists was the assumption 
that they knew what a better life would and could be and how 
that knowledge could be justified and implemented.
23 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 5.
24 Ibid., 6.
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During the interwar period, borders were being broken 
down as economic and health issues spanned across many states 
and were no longer centered in individual countries. 
Internationalists were looking for a true international 
morality that would include peaceful resolutions of conflicts, 
humanitarian aid to the needy and a commercial regime with 
just international trade rules.
The realists argued that the struggle for survival and 
power leaves little room for the motivations of conscience to 
provide a role in state decision making. Internationalists 
countered that most foreign-policy decisions generally do not 
involve survival but lesser objectives such as economic 
advantages, treaty rights, preservations of bases and national 
honor. Thus, there are many opportunities for conscience-based 
decisions in foreign policy matters.
Internationalists believed there were three channels 
through which morality could influence the formulation of 
foreign policy. First, they believed mankind was ripe for 
more education and involvement in political affairs and the 
informed masses would check actions of state leaders that 
contradicted moral principles. Secondly, the
internationalists believed that publicity generated by the 
League of Nations and other interest groups could pressure 
states to comply with moral standards to avoid international 
condemnation. Thirdly, political leaders were expected to 
have a moral standard themselves and follow those standards.
The internationalists advanced the view of human nature 
that stressed rationality and community. Realists, on the 
other hand, were filled with cynicism, underscoring conflict 
and the drive for power. Realists found a prophet in Reinhold 
Niebuhr, who developed a Christian interpretation of the 
nature of man. Niebuhr believed that all of man's 
"intellectual and cultural pursuits... become infected with 
the sin of pride [and] Man's pride and will-to-power disturb 
the harmony of creation.1,25 Niebuhr's ideas emphasized man's 
needs for security, which leads him to a desire for domination 
over others. Also characteristic of Niebuhr's writings is a 
claim that all of mankind's knowledge has an "ideological" 
taint and pretends to be more true than it is.26 Niebuhr 
believed it was his duty "to take all factors in a political 
and social situation which offer resistance to established 
norms, into account, particularly the factors of self-interest 
and self-power.1,27
E.H. Carr, a veteran diplomat, took the baton from 
Niebuhr to launch an attack on the centerpiece of the 
internationalist argument in his book The Twenty Years'
25 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human 
Nature (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1949), 179.
26 Ibid., 2.
27 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Augustine's Political Realism," 
reprinted in Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political 
Problems, 119 quoted in Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists, 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 18.
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Crisis, 1919-1939. Carr contended that the assertion that 
every nation was interested in banning warfare from the earth 
was merely a projection by predominately British and American 
scholars of their hope that Anglo-American dominance could be 
maintained without the necessity of war.28 The
internationalists had argued that it was in the rational 
interest of all nations to pursue peace and economic 
cooperation, but Carr pointed out that not every state was 
pursuing the utilitarian concept of the greatest good for the 
whole world. "To make the harmonization of interests the goal 
of political action is not the same thing as to postulate that 
a natural harmony of interests exists, and it is this latter 
postulate which has caused so much confusion in international 
thinking," cautioned Carr.29 Indeed in the 1920s when war was 
outlawed some nations found their goals were only attainable 
through war. Mussolini invaded Ethiopia and the Japanese 
attacked Manchuria. From the vantage point of 1939, Carr 
called into question the idealist action plan to educate the 
masses based on his observation of the sophistication and 
control of the propaganda campaign of the Fascists and the 
Nazis.
But as strong as was Carr's response to internationalist
28 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 17.
29 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1964), 51.
20
thought in the field of foreign affairs, he does not rule out 
the role of morality completely. Quoting Niebuhr's dictum 
"politics will, to the end of history, be an area where 
conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive 
factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their 
tentative and uneasy compromises," Carr goes on to say that 
"the compromises, like solutions of the other human problems, 
will remain uneasy and tentative. But it is an essential part 
of any compromise that both factors shall be taken into 
account. "30
The "realist" tradition came into full bloom with 
Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, published in 1948 at the 
zenith of American hegemony. McElroy asserts that all postwar 
literature dealing with the role of morality in foreign policy 
is either an elaboration of, or a response to, themes 
presented by Morgenthau.31 Morgenthau spoke out against the 
dangerous delusions of utopianism and behavioral approaches to 
statecraft. He argued for diplomacy that recognized the 
interests and power of all states. Morgenthau staged a 
crusade against crusades; that is, he counseled against the 
identification of a nation's goals with the moral purposes of 
the universe:
It is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of
30 Ibid., 100.
31 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 17.
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power that saves us from both moral excess and political 
folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, 
as political entities pursuing their respective interests 
defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to 
all of them.32
Political realism, like internationalism, is a 
philosophical disposition and set of assumptions about the 
world as well as human nature; in other words, it is an 
attitude regarding the human condition. Gilpin, a realist, 
writing in 1986, explains that there are three general 
characteristics connected to the realist tradition.33 [1] 
Realists feel that anarchy is the rule; order, justice, and 
morality are the exceptions. Realists, according to Gilpin, 
do not necessarily forgo the pursuit of these higher values 
but they feel the final arbiter of political associations is 
power. [2] The second foundation of realism is the concept of 
'•conflict groups." Man, according to Gilpin, is a tribal 
species and will compete for scarce resources as member of a 
group. Over time man has been a member of city-states, 
kingdoms, empires, and nation-states. Today nationalism is 
the name of the loyalty connected with our states. [3] The 
final characteristic of realism is that security is the
32 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1973), 3.
33 Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of 
Political Realism," Neorealism and its Critics ed. Jane J. 
Mansbridge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) , 
304-305.
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linchpin of human motivation. Without security, no other
values, such as beauty, truth or goodness, can come into play.
If Gilpin's realist view of human nature is accurate, why
was international idealism, with its attempts at international
cooperation and war prevention, dominant during the interwar
period? The answer lies in the fact, as I shall argue later,
that it is ideas that enable us to orient ourselves to life
and they are subject to an discursive process. Morgenthau
speculated that power-hunger was held in check by a European-
wide moral and intellectual consensus:
It is this consensus, both child and father, as it were, 
of common moral standards and a common civilization as 
well as common interests, which kept in check the 
limitless desire for power, potentially inherent, as we 
know, in all imperialisms, and prevented it from becoming 
a political actuality.34 
Morgenthau explains that the deterioration of our sense of
moral limitations is the result of two factors: "the
substitution of democratic for aristocratic responsibility in
foreign affairs and the substitution of nationalistic
standards of action for universal ones."35 As Morgenthau saw
it, it was democracy and nationalism that destroyed the moral
strictures of international relations. No longer were foreign
34 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man Verses Power Politics 
Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1962) p 195. as quoted 
in Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 21.
35 Ibid., 22.
minister posts filled for life by nobles who knew and had 
relations with nobles of other states. In a democracy these 
posts were filled by those in power and their only allegiance 
was to their nation or their status. Thompson concurs and 
explains that the diplomacy of the eighteenth century was 
between monarchs or members of an aristocratic elite. Since 
then, envoys, whom Thompson calls "'amateurs", have replaced 
the "professionals."36 These professionals had enjoyed the 
moral improvements since the fifteenth and sixteenth century 
when the sanctity of human life was less than today and it was 
as common to kill foreign statesmen who were particularly 
obnoxious.37 It was during the Hague Conferences (1899, 1907) 
and Geneva Conventions that the signatory nations laid down 
intricate legal rules of conduct which are reflective of moral 
rules of conduct to the effect that only soldiers ready to 
fight shall be the subject to confrontation, and civilians 
shall be exempt from participation. According to Morgenthau, 
it was not until the end of the Second World War that the 
destruction of major German cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
could be accepted with any equanimity.
In rebuttal, Joynt and Corbett maintain Morgenthau has 
oversimplified and distorted history by positing a kind of
36 Kenneth W. Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 12.
37 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy" 
Herbert Butterfield: The Ethics of History and Politics ed. 
Kenneth W. Thompson (University Press of America, 1980), 100.
golden age that started with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
which marked the end of the Holy Roman Empire and inaugurated 
modern Europe, to the end of World War I. They assert that, 
during the period in question, reason of state ruled as the 
supreme principle of foreign policy and cynicism, deception 
and fraud dominated diplomacy. The only limits to the 
struggle for power were primitive technology and the lack of 
communications, and in spite of these limitations, large areas 
were devastated and many lives sacrificed. They also argue 
that there is no evidence that a universal moral code existed 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Craig also 
contends that the relatively peaceful time in the eighteenth 
century was less a result of shared values and physical 
equilibrium than war fatigue and low levels of armament.38
As I have said at the start of the chapter, the 
literature on international relations has been preoccupied 
with the debate of national interest defined as national self- 
interest, and national interest as prescribed by following 
moral imperatives. And so it is that realists assume morality 
is just an attempt to legitimize actions taken out of self- 
interest. Internationalists argue that just because "self- 
interested" morality is frequently used for the legitimization 
of foreign policy, that does not mean it is always used in 
that manner. They argue that many people and nations express
38 Gordon Craig "Looking for Order" The New York Review 
May 12, 1994, 9.
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genuine commitments and deeply held beliefs and strive to 
instruct people in what they believe is right. Morgenthau 
himself admits that the pressure of shaming high public 
officials has had positive results in changing policy on 
particular issues.39
A second area where internationalists and realists 
disagree is on what Morgenthau called sentimentalism, or 
moralism or monism as it is sometimes called. Sentimentalism 
is the tendency to focus on a single moral value without 
regard to time and place and the acceptance of all the 
negative baggage that follows in the pursuit of that value. 
Examples of such sentimentalism include the single-minded 
pursuit of liberty or democracy. McElroy contends that the 
realists have no corner on the attempt to eradicate one­
dimensional and absolutist approaches to complex international 
issues. He objects to the realist notion that since 
sentimentalism is value-related and has led to tragic 
consequences, all moral reasoning will lead to the same 
result.
The dispute between the two parties appears to be 
irresolvable. Realism takes self-interest for granted. In 
practice, the realists have focused on a relatively narrow 
idea of U.S. interests and a military-based definition of
39 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy" 
Herbert Butterfield: The Ethics of History and Politics ed. 
Kenneth W. Thompson (University Press of America, 1980), 105.
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power. Theodore Roosevelt Is a prime example of an unabashed 
realist. He believed that international politics was highly 
competitive and only the strong and agile succeeded in 
protecting their interests and way of life.
In general, international approaches are those which look 
for conditions and solutions which are supposed to overcome 
and eliminate the selfish instincts of humans. 
Internationalists give higher priority to the moral dimension 
and look at the social and economic causes of the issue and 
rely on multilateral, diplomatic approaches. Woodrow Wilson 
could represent the internationalists. He embodied the 
tradition of American exceptionalism, the belief that America 
was different from other nations and could base its foreign 
policy on the standards of universal law and morality.
It is legitimate to ask if this debate helps to bring 
order and meaning to the study of international relations, or 
do the concepts of other political scientists who view 
national interest as politically defined by both self-interest 
and values coming into play (at both the national and 
international levels) offer a valid alternative? It is these 
theories that recognize that terms like national interest in 
the political arena become objects of endless contention, 
rationalization and self-deception. It is, however, the area 
I believe holds the most potential for advancement in the 
field of international relations.
CHAPTER 3
SELF-INTEREST AND POLITICS 
Self-Interest as Defined by Politics
This chapter will explore alternatives to the traditional 
realistic and utopian schools of thought regarding 
international relations. It is argued that national interest 
is the result of a political process and that the political 
leader must balance elements of both schools.
Keohane argues that the search for power takes many 
different forms depending on the ultimate goals of the actors 
and the context of the particular situation.40 He also 
explores the pursuit of self-abnegation that places a high 
value on international solidarity, lawfulness and rectitude. 
For Keohane there is no clear distinction between egoism and 
altruism because egoism can be farsighted as well as myopic. 
We can turn to Hobbes himself to see the elasticity of the 
concept of motivation. When asked why he had just given 
sixpence to a beggar, Hobbes answered, "I was in pain to 
consider the miserable condition of the old man; and now my
40 Robert 0. Keohane, "Empathy and International Regimes", 
Beyond Self-interest ed. Jane Mansbridge (Chicago: The
University Press, 1990), 227.
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alms, giving him some relief, doth also ease me."41 Depending 
on one's point of view, Hobbes' action may have been an act of 
altruism or self-interest. If international relations were to 
be based solely on self-interest defined narrowly and 
satisfied immediately, however, one may question whether this 
emphasis would not be self-defeating in the long term. This 
counterproductive approach would have a tendency to destroy 
common devotion to principles of justice and established 
mutualities in a community of nations as it does with 
individuals.
In this chapter I have chosen to argue that egoism and 
altruism are not mutually exclusive categories, but contend 
that the important issues are how people and organizations 
define self-interest and what beliefs and values they take 
into account. More importantly, we could ask how the actors 
see their own interests relative to those of others. For 
Keohane, four relationships may develop between actors 
depending on the extent of the independent interests and their 
interdependency. In a pure egoist world, two actors may be 
indifferent to the welfare of others. Instrumentally 
interdependent states consider the welfare of others only 
insofar as others can take action against them. These states 
are not concerned about the welfare of others for the other's 
sake, only possible retaliation for their actions.
41 John Aubrey, Brief Lives. Ed. Richard Barber (Totowa: 
Barnes and Noble Books, 1982), 159.
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Situationaly interdependent relationships become more 
prevalent in the close-knit trade and financial networks of 
the contemporary world. In this relationship, as the welfare 
of one state improves, so does another. For instance, 
improvement in the Brazilian economy directly increases the 
probability that they will pay their debt to the U.S. This 
type of interdependency has effectively kept in check egoistic 
attitudes of actors. Violation of commitments, disregard for 
the rights of other states and unrestrained use of force lead 
to instability in the environment and ultimately react upon 
the interests of the violator. This view is often described 
as "enlightened self-interest" which is another way of 
introducing values into political decisions. The final 
relationship examined is that of empathetic interdependence.
States may act to the benefit of others even if such actions 
have no apparent effect on the material well-being or security 
of the actor.42 A realist may argue that all relationships may 
be grounded in self-interest and the argument may hold up for 
major players in world affairs, but the argument loses steam 
when considering the foreign aid programs of Sweden or 
agencies such as CARE.
Keohane is arguing that there is something missing from 
the self-interested or the globalistic account of the world.
42 Robert 0. Koehane, "Empathy and International Regimes", 
Beyond Self-Interest ed. Jane Mansbridge (Chicago: The
University Press, 1990), 228-229.
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He does not deny the power of self-interest but contends that 
there are other goals or motivations that drive international 
relationships in addition to self-interest. In other words, 
self-interest is not a wrong but an incomplete account of 
motivation. The notion that nations seek only power rings 
hollow because different regimes may have different foreign 
policy goals. Nations and actors act as if their choices were 
real choices. Choices are not mere whims but are made for 
reasons with objectives and purposes. The ends decided upon, 
whether security, peace or war, are the results of ethical 
questions based on values. A student from the Realpolitik 
(realism) school of thought might argue that ethical decisions 
are made by and large in connection with the pursuit of power. 
If this were true nations would be in the position of having 
to define power. Is it the size of their army? their ability 
to protect themselves? their population? revenue? trade value? 
or area of the state? Even if an index was created values 
would have to be assigned.
On the other hand, a few simple moral principles do not 
exist which can be applied with assurance as guides to action 
in complex situations. International situations by nature 
consist of a wide combination of circumstances and no general 
rule can be derived which shows the ethical necessity of 
applying a particular principle.
Any attempt to portray the realists as amoral or the 
internationalists as moral zealots amounts to nothing more
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than a strawman argument. Indeed, the
realism/internationalist framework is not sufficient to make 
sense of political life, politics and foreign policy. 
Politicians deal with what Stone calls "strategically crafted 
arguments."43 Political reasoning is by metaphor and analogy, 
and paradox and ambiguity are the hallmarks of human 
existence. It is trying to get others to see abstract 
concepts such as national interest as one thing rather than 
another. Policy making in the political arena is a struggle 
of ideas. Political leaders struggle to interpret the 
collective will of their constituents and this abstract 
concept is then interpreted as national interest. Influence, 
cooperation and loyalty become powerful forces, and groups 
develop to take sides on the issue. Power is derived from a 
combination of all of these forces. To paraphrase Stone, 
power is used in conflicts over the ideas of fairness, 
justice, rightness and goodness. Powerful ideas such as 
colonialism, civil rights, environmental protection, and 
feminism have changed the course of history. Therefore, self- 
interest and ideas are inextricably intertwined.
Kingdon argues convincingly that self-interest is not 
only an incomplete explanation for behaviors or outcomes, but 
that the self-interest theoretical basis for policy is 
unsound. He points to studies that show narrowly focused
43 Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason, 
(Scott, Froesman and Company, 1988), 4.
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interest groups have difficulty in determining what was in 
their best interest.44 Even prominent realists, George 
Kennnan, Dean Acheson, Hans Morgenthau and Walter Lippman 
often took contradictory stances on the national interest in 
issues such as development of the H-bomb and antiballistic 
missile defense systems.45 Self-interest, whether applied to 
a person, group, or nation is expressed and defined in terms 
of ideas because people have ideas about their self-interest.
Kingdon also argues that ideas have a life of their own. 
As politicians use ideas to persuade others, ideas often 
become part of their identity. As the living idea evolves, 
the course of the idea may take a turn that works against the 
material self-interest of the promoter. For instance, 
recently many politicians have embraced the idea of term 
limits and argue that a policy generated from this idea will 
foster the public good, therefore his or her interest may 
include both the promotion of the idea for their own political 
advancement and concern for the public good even though it may 
not be in their self-interest if they want a long-time 
political career.
44 John W. Kingdon, "Politicians, Self-Interest, and 
Ideas", Chapter 3 in George Marcus and Russel Hanson, eds, 
Reconsidering the Democratic Public, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1993), 77.
45 See Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists (Louisiana 
State University Press, 1991) 89, 115.
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Ideas, Politics and the Common Good
Politics and policies can only occur within a community: 
public policy attempts to achieve something as a community. 
Even though conflict within a community exists about its 
goals, national foreign policy must assume both a collective 
will and a collective effort to achieve certain goals. 
Foreign policy goals have generally centered around 
suppressing hostile foreign powers and maintaining markets and 
travel lanes. National security, like national interest, is 
an ambiguous phrase that is not a guide for action but a 
concept that is subjective, relative, and dynamic. Factors 
involved in defining national security are the personality of 
the definer, the country's size, power and self-concept, and 
the nation's economy (rich nations have more to protect than 
poorer• nations). Defining national security, as well as 
national interest, is a goal-oriented activity accomplished 
through political deliberation in our democratic society. 
Deliberation on fundamental goals cannot take place without 
shared values and understandings because there must be 
widespread agreement about the nature of the central problems 
the policy addresses. This agreement takes the form of shared 
moral and intellectual assumptions. In other words, there are 
norms and standards of what is morally and politically 
acceptable. Without these standards the discussion
degenerates into an unending dispute. Therefore, policy 
deliberation is not only a function of goal setting but also
of norm setting that determines when certain conditions are to 
be regarded as problems. Deliberation can uncover both 
conflict and commonality and can help citizens decide what 
they want and then influence the content of those wants. 
Deliberation or public discussion of the public good is the 
essence of normative democratic theory. In understanding that 
motives are manifold and that certain conflicts are not 
irreconcilable, citizens and their representatives can both 
discover and create a common good through deliberation. There 
is no question that included in this deliberation are some 
people pursuing their own narrowly defined self-interest, but 
in our nation and in international politics they are not 
allowed to do it blatantly and exclusively.
This thesis suggests that there are two methods to define 
the role of national interest in the formation of policy; one 
makes national interest the result of the political process 
and the other contends that it is its precondition. The 
former has self-interested players determining policy that, in 
theory, is best for the greatest number. Although political 
resources are unequally distributed, individuals are allowed 
to pursue their interests as they see fit. Standard pluralist 
doctrine declares that there is no objective standard by which 
to measure the wisdom of any particular policy. The 
procedural process of determining policy is the only thread 
that ties the participants together. The results of this 
process are that no policy can be evaluated as contrary to the
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national interest. This approach does not look upon the 
nation as a whole but sees a framework that allows self- 
interested people or groups to pursue their desires.
The second method, W. David Clinton argues, is a method 
of defining national interest based on the common good of a 
society with a common sense of shared history and destiny. 
Clinton acknowledges clashes of immediate interests of 
individuals or groups but contends their interests coincide in 
a common good:
Because individuals find their highest fulfillment in 
communion with others, the preservation and perfection of 
their common enterprise, the society, forms their highest 
interest, to which other, more particular, interests, 
desires, and wishes may justifiably be sacrificed.46 
This method allows for a role to be played by justice. It is
the statesmen who must determine whether justice demands
conformity to some abstract formula or a tolerable harmony
between competing forces. Those who attempt to obtain the
latter by acting solely from self-interest would choose not to
discover mutual interests or act with a sense of obligation to
a wider community. In either case though, the political
process, defined as either competition and bargaining among
groups or debates over first principles, determines the
national interest. The internal domestic debate is performed
among participants within the nation. The components of this
46 W. David Clinton, "Politics and the National Interest: 
The Two Conversations", in Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy 
ed. W. David Clinton (University Press of America, 1988) 42.
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process are well-known and include the media, Congress, public 
opinion, domestic politics, the influence of interest groups 
and the bureaucracy.
Howard J. Wiarda explains that the internal political 
debate does not take into account what goes on beyond the 
borders of the state in question and therefore only represents 
part of the equation that amounts to national interest.47 
Outside the borders of the state are the influencing factors 
of international politics.
Politics and Morality Among Nation-States
This political process outlined above is limited to 
participants internal to the nation. We have seen that the 
political process to determine the national interest is not 
simply a clash of particular interests nor is it a 
disinterested search for impartial justice. It can be argued 
that nations who share common values or a spirit of justice 
can share an "internal" process but global rivals with no 
authoritative institution create many, usually conflicting, 
national interests. On this level a commonly accepted system 
of justice among parties is inconceivable; therefore statesmen 
must not rely on the concept of justice but that of prudence.
International politics, as opposed to municipal or 
national politics, is sometimes unyielding to the restraints
47 Howard J. Wiarda, In Search of Policy, The United 
States and Latin America, (Washington: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984) 31-34.
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of laws and norms because of the status of national 
sovereignty. International agreements are subject to 
ratification of the nation's political bodies and subject to 
change by those bodies. Lawmaking bodies on the international 
scene often lack authority to impose sanctions. Therefore, 
individual nations or alliances are left to decide on the 
level of participation in international sanctions. As a 
result of these characteristics, the international system has 
been driven to flexible rules and norms. Agreements between 
major powers have taken on the form of implied agreements, not 
solemn contracts.48 These types of agreements allow political 
leaders to vacillate between positions, respond to changing 
circumstances or repackage their image when the public or 
opponents question their stances. Through these agreements 
and international conferences, informal international norms 
are developed, not in a formal sense but as precepts and 
practices broadening out from one precedent to the next.
In international politics, states press for many 
different claims in hopes that they will attain their own 
overall national interest. These claims may include the 
involvement with other states or may be in objection to the 
interests of them. International politics, like internal 
politics, must submit to influences. The state's geopolitical 
position is influenced by many factors: its resources,
48 Kenneth W. Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 9.
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location, size and relationships with other states. Those in 
strong positions can devote some of their resources to the 
promotion of their ideals, for instance when the United States 
intervened in Vietnam. Other influences that can serve as a 
restraint or motivation on United States policy are 
international constraints such as world opinion, social 
movements and notions such as manifest destiny. Internal 
interests of states must be brought to the global arena and be 
effectively argued to achieve the good of the nation. Each 
state then determines what constitutes a good argument and 
what interests can be justified by argument and what must be 
imposed by force. In this sense a common rationality exists 
and national interest becomes a force of reciprocity and 
restraint.
W. David Clinton argues that there is a kind of 
conversation between the domestic and international forces of 
international relations. He maintains that the external 
debate may intrude on the internal debate. This intrusion may 
take place when restraints are placed on personal interests to 
allow the state to compete in the world arena. Participants 
in the internal debate may also seek to influence national 
interest by appeals to world opinion. In this case, general 
international consensus is used as a source of authority in 
the argument to move that state's definition of its national 
interest in a certain direction.
The internal debate can also influence the external
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debate. A state's argument for a gain at another state's 
expense would be considered more readily by others if the 
first state was fundamentally satisfied with their status as 
opposed to a nation whose leaders were calling for conquest or 
an expansion of power.
On the international level, states invariably attempt to 
make justice the foundation of their arguments, although there 
is no obligation to do so. Commonly accepted ethical 
standards play a guiding role in the effectiveness of 
arguments. These norms do not prescribe what nations must do 
for each other but what they may do to one another. In this 
political atmosphere, bounds are not fixed but move with time 
and circumstances and consequences. The political leader and 
policy maker must recognize the nature of these norms and how 
they effect his or her national interest. The practice of 
statecraft is conducted in a fragmented world with many 
states, each with its own system of government, cultural 
tradition and national purpose. Transnational moral consensus 
is virtually nonexistent; however, states are frequently 
compelled to stand for principles beyond self-interest and 
appeal to more than the calculus of power.
Moral absolutism, though, asserts the existence of 
universally binding, absolute moral laws that can tell us 
which acts are right and which are wrong. When considering 
even the most noble goals such as justice and freedom it 
becomes clear that these are sometimes competing and opposing.
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Aristotle saw that all forms of government were not the same 
but that the best one was developed for the environment in 
which it was formed. In other societies, for instance, 
excessive profit in business is theft, and Marxists believe 
the institution of private property is immoral. To compensate 
for this incongruence, options would be to ignore the 
variation, consider them variations with the same general root 
or reject the idea that there are universal moral principles.
Relativists do the latter. They argue that either there 
are no moral laws of any sort, or else that if there are moral 
laws, they could have force only relative to a particular 
cultural group and within a particular historical context. 
Morgenthau insisted that relativism is essential in the 
relation between moral principles and foreign policy. He 
cites two relationships; a relativism in time, when certain 
principles are applicable in one period of history and not 
applicable in another, and a relativism in terms of culture —  
of contemporaneous culture —  in that certain principles are 
obeyed by certain nations or political civilizations and not 
in others.49 Hence, relativism claims that there are no 
universally valid moral laws and that all standards of 
evaluation are contingent and culture-specific. Another 
approach, and one that I advocate, would be to put the
49 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy" 
Herbert Butterfield: The Ethics of History and Politics ed. 
Kenneth W. Thompson (University Press of America, 1980) 102.
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emphasis on character and virtues of individuals and not rules 
and obedience. In this sense, morality is thoughtful and 
reflective and we could consider people moral who are not 
necessarily adhering to rules, but who show good judgement.
Statesmen are confronted with choices and, as Thompson 
observes, "we deceive ourselves in supposing that every choice 
does not involve gains and losses or benefits and sacrifices 
for those who are principally involved."50 Moral reasoning is 
the arena where ethical imperatives and political realities 
reconcile each other.
Prudence and Political Leadership
The concept of self is at the heart of ethics. The self 
is an agent, a doer of deeds, the actor, who reaps rewards or 
suffers the consequences of those actions. The concept of 
self with its many facets is irreplaceable in discussions of 
national interest and ethics. Satisfying one's personal 
desires immediately at the expense or in neglect of all others 
is called selfishness. Prudence, on the other hand, is the 
longer term, more circumspect satisfaction of oneself. The 
emphasis on oneself, in this sense, is on the whole self, and 
not merely one's desire. Aristotle defines the prudent man as 
one who is able to deliberate well and determine what is good 
and advantageous as a means to the good life. Prudence is "a
50 Kenneth W.Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980) , 21.
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truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in 
relation to things that are good and bad for human beings."51 
We expect our political leaders to exercise prudence or 
practical wisdom in public affairs and to discern what is good 
for themselves and the rest of the nation.
Aristotle explains that prudence and the moral virtue 
temperance are closely related. More specifically, he says 
the word 'temperance' means preserving prudence. Aristotle's 
definition of temperance is the observance of the mean in 
relation to pleasures and pain.52 He contends that a person 
who has a distorted view of life because of excessive pursuit 
of pleasure or avoidance of pain cannot exercise the practical 
virtue of prudence. According to Aristotle, correct actions 
are based on nonrigid principles that speak generally, and 
individual cases require a sensitive and fair reading of the 
circumstances felt to be involved by those "on site."
Prudence is in what Aristotle calls the Calculative 
Faculty of the rational soul. However, its close ties to 
temperance remind us that it is not a purely rational quality 
because a purely rational quality can be forgotten but a moral 
lapse is not attributable to a lapse of memory. Prudence 
deals with the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be 
determined by intelligence alone. A perception or intuition
51 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1140b.
52 Nicomachean Ethics 1107b.
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is necessary.53 Therefore, Aristotle has determined that 
prudence is a moral as well as an intellectual virtue.54 The 
results of prudent activities, especially among people in 
policy formulating positions, extend to the affairs of one's 
family and community. People who make laws and set policy 
deliberate and act. The process of deliberation requires a 
mixture of reason and emotion. The emotional investment 
amounts to the policy maker's understanding their own needs 
and the needs of others in the decision.55 Policy makers need 
to understand their own fears, hates, loves, and pride as well 
as engaging in emotional sympathy, identification and 
judgement of others.
We are told in book I of the Nicomachean Ethics "that the 
good of the state [as opposed to the individual] is manifestly 
a greater and more perfect good, both to attain and to 
preserve"56 and that the proper role of the politician is to be 
concerned with his own happiness and that of mankind.
A question for those who examine political leadership and 
international relations is whether an objective basis exists 
for a comparative evaluation of ethical standards of one
53 Nicomachean Ethics 1142a.
54 Nicomachean Ethics 1140b.
55 See Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character, Aristotle's 
Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 44-50 for 
her discussion on Aristotle and emotion.
56 Nicomachean Ethics 1094b.
statesman to another other than ascribing good or evil to 
their basic goals. We can further ask if a statesman should 
do or tolerate evil things in carrying out the duties of his 
office if they are a means to an intended good. To some, the 
answer is an ethic of neutrality. This is the notion that 
leaders ought to act neutrally in the sense that they should 
follow not their own moral principles but the demands of their 
constituents. The ethic of neutrality portrays the ideal 
political leader as a completely reliable instrument of the 
goals of the nation, never injecting personal values into the 
process of furthering these goals. The definition assumes 
that the political leader has only two choices; obey the 
demands of constituents or resign. In other words, the 
leadership style of those who practice the ethic of 
neutrality, if indeed this is possible, is no leadership.
Those who defend leaders who perform acts that would 
normally be considered unacceptable if done by the average 
citizen usually call upon the "dirty hands argument." This 
argument holds that it is inevitable that statesman will be 
required to do unethical actions to accomplish ethical ends 
and therefore cannot be condemned for engaging in conduct that 
is functionally inherent to the position. This two-moralities 
viewpoint was developed by Max Weber in his essay "Politics as 
a Vocation."57 Weber makes a distinction between two standards
57 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H.H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
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of morality: one for the ideal world or the way the world 
ought to be, and one for the real world— the world of 
politics. According to Weber, successful political leaders do 
not confuse the two realms. He calls the former world the 
ethic of ultimate ends which asks only about the purity of 
intentions in considering the moral intention of an action. 
Opposed to this ethic is the ethic of responsibility that asks 
only about the foreseeable results of one's action. To accept 
the former, the political leader would run the risk of being 
an ineffective leader when outcomes are measured. To accept 
the latter, in other words, that political leaders do indeed 
have dirty hands, is to make them essentially immune from 
moral judgement, allowing leaders to commit crimes without the 
fear of denunciation. This thesis contends that moral 
principles cannot be dismissed as having no real connection 
to, or impact on foreign policy decisions, but neither can 
specific moral criteria be established to use as a yardstick 
to evaluate political leaders.
Efforts to establish such moral criteria usually 
emphasize certain moral precepts as self-evident. In this 
method, moral conclusions are established initially and then 
details of the situation are compared to these moral 
absolutes. Some ethicists have pointed to a few distinctive 
attributes of moral absolutes that set them off from other 
aspects of ethics:
(New York, 1958), 77-128.
1. Moral rules have great importance and they override all 
other considerations including self-interest.
2. Morality is universal and rule-governed. Moral rules 
apply to everyone everywhere and without qualification or 
exception.
3. Moral rules are rational and objective and are not 
formulated to anyone's advantage or particular person's 
interests in mind.
4. Morality is concerned with other people. This is 
generalized by the many different variations of the 
Golden Rule. Whether you consider Confucius' "Do not 
unto others what you would not they should unto you" or 
Buddha's "Hurt not others with that which pains yourself" 
or Kant's "Act so that the maxim of your action can be 
willed as universal law" all variations are opposed to 
selfishness.58
Moral absolutism asserts the existence of universally binding 
moral laws that can tell us which acts are right and which are 
wrong. However, it would be impossible to live within an all 
encompassing set of religious or other principles and not 
uncover controversy. When we assume that morality is a set of 
impersonal rules and principles, and action is taken because 
of adherence to the rules and not to avoid punishment, we 
accept Kant's perspective: universalism. This theory contends 
that morality ought to give moral guidance concerning what is 
right and wrong, that it should provide moral laws.
By contrast, Mark Johnson describes our moral tradition 
as one of constraint and limitation founded on a metaphorical
58 Robert C. Solomon, Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1984), 7.
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conception that reason is a force and moral laws are 
constraints.59 These theories do not recognize the full 
complexity of situations that confront policy makers. They do 
not recognize that we do not live in a world of facts but we 
live in a world, as Martin Rein states "where values and 
purposes dominate and shape the facts we attend to and care 
about."60 If moral rules exist they do not act as "trump" over 
other principles. An obvious example is the moral principle 
of "thou shalt not kill." Many people who consider themselves 
moral, feel it is permissible to kill others trying to kill 
them. Even if specific morals could be agreed upon, moral 
systems might collide. Pro-life and pro-choice advocates both 
accept the principles of "thou shalt not kill" and "a person 
has a special right to his or her own body." The conflict 
occurs when these two principles are interpreted and applied. 
Morality allows for multiple framings of any given situation, 
and this leads to different moral consequences.
In a world of ambiguity and paradox, Aristotle's notion 
of prudence or practical wisdom is a key element the political 
leader must rely upon to make decisions. This virtue, as 
Aristotle describes it, stands opposed to self interest and 
insures the rightness of the means adopted to the gains
59 Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 18.
60 Martin Rein, Value-Critical Policy Analysis, Ch. 5 from 
Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jenning, eds., Ethics, the Social 
Sciences, and Policy Analysis (Plenum Press, 1983) 88.
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desired in that specific situation. Man, for Aristotle, has 
a social nature and he believed that no person could live well 
without friends or associates. Aristotle acknowledged the 
dark side of human nature and politics but refused to succumb 
to the "that's the way it is" view of human nature. For 
Aristotle, politics was a world of variation, a world where 
things could be other than they are. Man is the originator of 
action, a union of desire and intellect, that could deliberate 
over things that are variable. Statesmen who are called upon 
to fulfill their idea of good must rely on character and 
habits of decision making. Contrary to the realist approach 
characterized as cautiously maneuvering for the survival of a 
particular community, and the idealists who refuse to mix 
moral imperatives with politics, prudence maintains a 
connection between the spheres of politics and morality. The 
result is a broad concept of the common good that allows for 
a great deal of diversity.
Prudence does not split the world of complex social and 
political realities from the concern for accomplishing good in 
practical daily life dilemmas. It focuses on a good 
attainable by action with equal weight given to the means and 
the ends. The political leader's role is complicated by the 
desire to pursue many goals, optimally coordinated, in some 
coherent pattern in and through time. Aristotle argued that 
it was an integrated and stable character that allowed one to 
form systematically related intentions that realized one's
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general ends. The policy maker must look at a wide range of 
ends and provide reasons for a particular decision to promote 
or abandon a particular end. At the core of Aristotle's 
concept of prudence were three character traits that the 
political leader needed to make prudent decisions. These 
component elements were: deliberateness, understanding and 
consideration.
Deliberation is a practical virtue concerned with the 
affairs of men. Deliberation implies the investigating and 
calculating of the means to achieve a particular good. 
Deliberative excellence, according to Aristotle, is the 
intellectual quality displayed in the process of correctly 
investigating the problem at hand. Particular facts are 
derived from experience. Experience leads to knowledge of the 
possibilities open for action and makes the statesman less 
likely to be caught off guard. Mixed with the other elements 
of prudence, statesmen can deliberate and arrive at the right 
conclusion on the right grounds at the right time.
Understanding is the ability to judge what another person 
says about matters, for to judge rightly is the same as good 
understanding.61 The subjects that Aristotle discusses are not 
the scientific fields but those that one may have doubts about 
and may deliberate. To understand someone else's position 
requires putting oneself in their place. This way the prudent
61 Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 114 3a.
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statesman also can assess their strengths and weaknesses and 
develop the proper policy toward them.
Finally, the third character trait or habit in Aristotle's 
list of elements of prudence is consideration. This trait 
requires a person to be able to judge correctly what is 
equitable. By equitable, Aristotle does not restrict his 
meaning to legal justice but calls for the political leader to 
develop judgments himself. The reason for this latitude is 
that laws are general statements and can cover the majority of 
cases, but there are exceptions to the law because its 
absoluteness is defective. In such cases, equity is superior. 
This trait is especially important for international relations 
that lack formal strictures. This area of conduct is usually 
in the domain of free choice and it is characterized by 
nonenforceability. In this sense, the character of a 
statesman can be measured by his obedience to the 
unenforceable.
These three virtues require the prudent political leader 
to assess the situation at hand and make him responsible for 
omissions and distortions of the information surrounding the 
issue. His interests and dispositions as well as historical 
circumstance will influence how he sees the salient features 
of the issue. The prudent political leader decides ends and 
means by controlling his own character. In the words of 
Nancy Sherman, "To pursue an apparent good is just to construe
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certain moments as occasions for acting for that end.”62
The Aristotelian notion of prudence consists of a process 
of moral reasoning that weighs and balances information. It 
also filters theoretical concepts through various components 
and serves as a remedy to mean-spiritedness, self- 
righteousness and the tendency to develop overly idealistic 
goals. Aristotle emphasized character including intellectual 
and moral skills and habits of the statesman as critical to 
the development of the prudent statesman. However, policies 
developed from moral principles are not sufficient to ensure 
that policies are morally sound. Moral principles are only 
realized through specific acts. It is clear that more than 
just a good and decent person of high morals is required to be 
an excellent statesman. Aristotle's definition of the prudent 
statesman does not require him to rule out consideration of 
economic necessity and power politics, nor require him to 
relentlessly hang onto unrealistic goals, but it does require 
him to develop ways of thinking and acting that cultivate 
intellectual and volitional habits and skills that include 
deliberation, sympathy and understanding.
62 Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character, Aristotle's 
Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 33.
Criticisms and Intuitive Values
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Critics claim that the notion of prudence is inadequate 
as a guide to ethical statecraft. Aristotle's emphasis on the 
elements of spontaneity and personal freedom in exercising 
prudence may be interpreted as being a broad rationalization 
of selfish opportunism under which the grossest immoralities 
could be condoned. Alternatives to reliance on prudence 
usually attempt to create an ethical system of international 
relations, based on the validity of ethical imperatives 
derived from such issues as nuclear deterrence, distributive 
justice or a safe environment. While there would be little 
debate on the merits of these goals, prudence recognizes that 
moral principles are translated into actual policies through 
a complex process which depends, to a great extent, on human 
decisions. Other alternatives to the use of prudence include 
attempts at creating a technical decision making system or one 
based on Biblical literalism. These too ignore the uniqueness 
of every situation and agent.
Stephen A. Garret suggests that moral standards can be 
applied to political leaders in determining whether their 
"dirty hands" are only a regrettable but understandable 
function of their position and not an abuse of their power. 
Garrett makes use of what he calls "intuitive values" or what 
Aristotle called first principles. Garret identifies an 
intuitive value judgement as one in which a certain action can
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be described as "invariably wrong or right regardless of its 
effects, and reflects the pure dictates of conscience.1,63 In 
an example, Garret sites the slaughter of noncombatants as an 
evil despite whatever utilitarian benefits may be obtained 
from ignoring the tenet. This yardstick may easily condemn 
Napoleon and Hitler but the method would not provide 
definitive results in cases not so obvious.
Aristotle argued first principles come to those who have 
adequate experience and are skilled in making deliberative 
choices. Through these choices, the virtuous statesman 
qualifies and refines ends and places them in priority among 
other ends. There is no doubt that Aristotle and most 
statesmen would place a high priority on the sanctity of life 
but prudence warns against the possibly dangerous yearning for 
moral simplification and certainty.
Statecraft using the tradition of prudence is more than 
simply affirming a noble aim or relying on balance of power. 
The founding fathers of the United States used this tradition 
in establishing the republic. They assumed that politics 
would bring out self-interest and called for a nation that 
balanced the rights of the states and that of the national 
government. Prudence in international relations provides the 
intellectual resources for approaching the theory and practice
63 Stephen A. Garrett, Political Leadership and the 
Problem of "Dirty Hands" Ethics and International Affairs, 
Volume 8 1994: 166.
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of statecraft and is an alternative to abstract moralism or 
hopeless cynicism.
CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY: PANAMA CANAL TREATIES 
Introduction
There have been few issues in the twentieth century 
American foreign policy that have been as persistent and 
controversial as the question of America's role with the 
Panama Canal. The Canal issue represents one of the great 
battlefields in an ideological war over this nation's proper 
role in world affairs and represents the conflict between 
advocates of the two fundamentally different philosophies 
discussed in this thesis. To some, the Canal demonstrates the 
economic and strategic benefits derived from power politics. 
To others, it is a symbol of shameful belligerence and 
exploitation that is morally wrong and practically 
anachronistic. Perhaps there is no better U.S. foreign policy 
issue that confirms that the notion of national interest is 
politically driven and dynamic.
Initially, when constructed, the canal was perceived as 
a great source of pride for Americans and was accepted by the 
international community, but as early as the 1950s the Canal 
proved to be a detriment to the image of the U.S. abroad and 
a point of discussion among U.S. policy makers. The 
discussion culminated with a debate on the Senate floor in 
February, March and April 1978 about a neutrality treaty which
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would give control of the canal to the Panamanians in the year 
2000. These debates took place at critical juncture in the 
history of American foreign policy. At the close of the 
Vietnam War, Americans were looking for explanation of past 
failures and guidance for new direction. The controversy 
initiated a dialogue over ideas of national interest placed in 
carefully crafted arguments. In a broad historical 
perspective, the evolution of American canal foreign policy 
provides an illuminating case study of the relationship of 
external and internal determinants exerting pressure on 
foreign policy. The case show how the internal debate, 
insulated for many years from the external determinants, 
finally had to recognize the significance of the global 
community.
Finally, the Panama Canal debates show the importance of 
deliberation in foreign policy development. Over the years 
since the Panama Canal first became a political issue, there 
have been numerous speeches, articles, and reports on all 
sides of the issue. These have served the interests of the 
polity by forcing participants to consider alternative points 
of view and to make a better case for their argument. In 
order to do this, messages had to ring true, tap shared 
emotions, and provide sound rationales for political 
commitments and actions. It is in this milieu that the 
political leader has to search for the significance or the 
deeper meaning of public debate over foreign policy. They
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must make the distinction between words and deeds, between the 
symbolic and the concrete, in short the political leader must 
create meaningful perceptions abstracted from a complex 
bewildering world.
The intent of providing this case study is not to cut 
through the rhetoric of the Panama Canal debate nor is it to
provide a framework for political leaders to work from in
deciding which way to vote on this or any other issue. 
Instead, the case study is intended to demonstrate the issues 
reflected in and promoted by the debate, in hopes of gaining 
insight to the processes by which foreign policy issues are 
generally created, debated and resolved in America.
An attempt is made to present a balanced historical 
perspective of the Panama Canal issue. Substantial background 
is provided to give the reader a grounding to make sense of 
the arguments. It would not be surprising if, after reading 
this account of the Panama Canal Treaties and applying 
Aristotle's concept of prudence, the reader determines that 
the Senate made the wrong choice by ratifying the Treaties. 
The issue remains controversial because its decisions revolved 
around difficult issues of lasting moral and strategic 
significance. Conclusions cannot be proved correct or 
incorrect until the treaties are put to the test in the
international arena after the year 2000.
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Background
Legend has it that Panama received its name when Spanish 
conquistadors met a Cuna Indian nearly 500 years ago and asked 
where they could find gold. The reply was "panna mai - far 
away" in hope that the intruders too would go far away. If 
greed of gold gave birth to Panama, it was Panama's geography 
that has been both its historical blessing and curse. Panama 
stretches east and west for 400 miles, connecting South and 
Central America. It varies in width from 30 to 120 miles with 
the Caribbean Sea on the north and the Pacific Ocean on the 
south. At least since the Spanish ruled the isthmus in 1501, 
and probably earlier, the prospect of connecting the two 
bodies of water was envisioned. The Spanish had to settle for 
a footpath rather than a canal. The acquisition of California 
from Mexico in 1848 and the discovery of gold in California a 
year later prompted American entrepreneurs to build a railroad 
linking the two oceans in order to transport passengers and 
cargo. Some 400,000 gold rushers passed through the 
international shortcut en route to California.
By 1876 Panama had become a part of the nation of 
Colombia and the French obtained a concession to build a canal 
across the small country. With only one-third of the task 
completed, the project was abandoned with a staggering loss of 
lives and capital.
At the end of the 19th century, Theodore Roosevelt and 
his naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan concluded that naval
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control of both the Caribbean and the Pacific was a virtual 
strategic imperative and a waterway through the isthmus was a 
prerequisite. Nicaragua was considered but rejected in favor 
of the shorter Panama route and fears about seismic stability. 
Twenty five years after the French failure and with the 
greater technical and medical expertise to protect the labor 
force from the ravages of malaria and yellow fever, the dream 
of building a canal through Panama was in sight. The dream 
started with a treaty between the United States and Panama 
that proved to be the source of deep resentment among 
Panamanians for seventy-five years.
A Frenchman, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was involved in 
every step of the process of the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty. Bunau-Varilla had been chief engineer of the private 
French company that made the first attempt at a Panama Canal. 
When he learned the United States was interested in another 
attempt to cross Central America with a canal, he saw a way to 
recoup his company's losses by selling the company's remaining 
assets and construction rights to the United States. His 
lobbying efforts in Washington helped reverse a Congressional 
vote for the canal through Nicaragua. When Columbia, of which 
Panama was a part, infuriated Roosevelt by refusing to give 
the United States the desired concessions, it was Bunau- 
Varilla who helped plan the revolution that made Panama an 
independent nation. The United States quickly recognized the 
new nation and declared its intention of protecting Panama
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from Colombian efforts to reclaim it. Bunau-Varilla was then 
designated the temporary representative of the Panamanian 
government in Washington. His assignment was to start 
negotiations for a canal but not to enter into any 
negotiations that might injure Panamanian sovereignty. Bunau- 
Varilla had other ideas, and as the new president of Panama 
was sailing north to participate in the negotiations, the ink 
was drying on a treaty between Bunau-Varilla and Secretary of 
State John Hay.
The treaty was less favorable to Panama than the original 
treaty considered with Colombia before the revolution. The 
United States was given exclusive jurisdictional rights in 
perpetuity with a ten-mile-wide strip of territory where the 
Canal was to be dug. In return, the United States agreed to 
guarantee the independence of Panama, to pay the new 
government $10 million for the Canal Zone rights , and to pay 
an annual fee of $250,000. Bunau-Varilla's French company 
received $40 million for its rights and assets sold to the 
United States. When the treaty was brought before the 
Panamanians for ratification, Bunau - Varilla misled them into 
believing an angry United States would withdraw its 
protection.64 Fearful of their exposure, the Panamanian 
government gave its approval to the new pact.
64 The best historical account of this entire period is 
contained in David McCullough's The Path between the Seas (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1977).
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Thus the fate of 550 square miles of Panama's best real 
estate, including the nation's prime deep-water port 
locations, was sealed for perpetuity by an American and a 
Frenchman. The practical importance of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty amounted to the existence of a colonial enclave in the 
heart of Panama that was entirely under U.S. control. The 
Canal Zone had its own American court system and American 
police. Discrimination against Panamanians was high, all 
high-paying jobs went to Americans and until the late 1940s 
there were even separate drinking fountains for Americans and 
Panamanians.
Objections to the 1903 treaty began almost at once and 
although the Panamanian government would be dominated by 
elites loyal to the United States for the next forty years, 
the period was filled with periodic episodes of anti-American 
violence. The Panamanians were successful in obtaining a 
greater share of the canal revenues; however, no ground was 
gained on the sovereignty question.
Ideas, American Presidents and Panama
The first half of this thesis argued that particular 
policies, strategies, and actions are the result of a 
country's peculiar geopolitical dilemmas, foreign policy 
traditions, and the statesman's own belief system. Each 
statesman during each era provided a new take on Canal policy. 
Each U.S. president became preoccupied with protecting this
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strategic asset from foreign powers and the surrounding area's 
instability. All chose, however, different ways to define 
U.S. interests and defend the Canal. Theodore Roosevelt tried 
to preclude instability and revolution by multilateral 
negotiations leading to international treaties. William 
Howard Taft used Marines and dollars to help the country 
remain solvent and stable. Woodrow Wilson replaced dollar 
diplomacy with the promotion of freedom but continued to use 
the Marines. Each president that addressed the Canal issue 
was forced to redefine the national interest and how to 
promote it. As discussed earlier, each approach was relative 
to one period of history and contemporary culture.
According to George Moffett, in his account of the 
ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, the period after 
the mid-1950s was characterized by three trends.65 The first 
was one of Panamanian nationalism ushered in by "flag riots" 
when young Panamanians tried to parade the Panamanian flag 
through the Canal Zone. The second trend was a growing 
sympathy of American administrations in favor of revisions in 
the 1903 treaty with Panama. The Kennedy administration 
searched for a substitute for the agreement. The Johnson 
administration policy shifted toward the restoration of 
Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone. By 1974, during 
the Nixon administration, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
65 George D. Moffett III, The Limits of Victory, (Cornell 
University Press, 1985), 27.
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and Panamanian foreign minister Juan Tack had penciled the 
outline of the treaty that would finally be approved in 1977. 
In total five drafts of a revised treaty were completed before 
the 1977 draft was completed, each one progressively 
compromising the U.S. position. The third trend was a growing 
American opposition toward any reform in the treaty. The 
opposition is characterized by Ronald Reagan's famous line, 
"We built it, we paid for it, it's ours!"
The rioting in Panama in 1958 was over the idea of 
sovereignty. No longer would the Panamanians settle for 
higher annual payments or mere modifications to their 
subordinate status. This period signified a turning point; 
realists would argue it signaled that the U.S. was at the 
beginning of the end of its world power status. 
Internationalists would argue it was the beginning of a new 
era in hemispheric relations. In either case it was the 
Panamanians tight grasp of the idea of sovereignty that 
initiated the change of U.S. canal policy.
It was the Eisenhower administration that began searching 
for changes in canal policy, which culminated in the 
ratification of the 1978 canal treaties. The first change was 
symbolic but marked (to many) the end of exclusive control 
over the Panama Canal. A new "flag policy" was announced on 
September 17, 1960. Four days later, a single Panamanian flag 
was hoisted just inside the Zone within sight of downtown 
Panama City. Eisenhower was not dissuaded from the policy by
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a 390 to 12 House of Representatives vote condemning the 
policy. In this instance, Eisnerhower was reacting to an 
"external" argument made by the Panamanians instead of the 
"internal" recommendation made by the House.
Panama was not a matter of particular importance to the 
Kennedy administration. His task force to examine the growing 
problem recommended the construction of a new, sea-level canal 
across the isthmus and then placing it under an "inter- 
Americanized" jurisdiction. The latter recommendation was a 
painless concession to Panama since a canal without locks 
would obviate the need for the large U.S. military and 
administrative personnel. In the end, Kennedy too settled for 
adjustment to the flag policy and allowed Panamanian flags to 
be flown at all nonmilitary sites within the Zone, a minor but 
a further symbolic concession to the rising demands for 
sovereignty.
With Panamanian flags flying high over many parts of the 
Canal Zone, three days of violent riots erupted in 1964 that 
left 25 people dead and over $2 million of damage to American 
property in the Canal Zone. Panamanian President Robert 
Chiari strategically used the event to call external attention 
to U.S. occupation by allowing the riots to run their course, 
by not calling out the National Guard, and hinting Communist 
participation. Panama then appealed to the UN Security 
Council and the Council of Ministers of the Organization of 
American States for reprisal against the U.S. for an
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unprovoked armed attack on Panama. Both organizations found 
both parties to blame.
President Johnson's reaction was to begin negotiations on 
a new treaty. This agreement would abrogate the 1903 treaty, 
recognize Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and allow 
the U.S. to build a sea-level canal and control it until the 
year 2067. While the Panamanians held tight to the idea of 
sovereignty for Panama, U.S. citizens could not accept the 
idea. In 1967, before the treaty (that was two years in the 
making) could be signed, details of the pact were publicized 
and it was crushed by a wave of opposition in Congress, 
veterans groups, and patriotic societies and traditional 
right-wing groups.
During the Johnson years it became apparent that there 
were conflicting sets of domestic (internal) and international 
(external) pressures. Policy makers from the Eisenhower 
administration onward were more responsive to international 
concerns; however, the public and Congress resisted the 
positions taken by the executive branch. In the face of the 
widening positions of these two groups, it would be ten years 
before another treaty could be successfully negotiated.
External Determinants
Other factors outside the edicts of the 1903 treaty would 
also have a profound effect on Panamanian-U.S. relations. 
Racial and economic equality were being demanded in the
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subject areas of Asia and Africa in the 1930s and the 
weakening of the European colonial powers during World War II 
gave rise to a new international egalitarianism that would 
spread around the world. The rejection of colonization was 
based on the Western principles of freedom and self- 
determination. The leaders of the nationalist movements in 
British, French, German and Belgian colonies had been almost 
all educated in the imperial countries. As they returned to 
their homelands they became aware of the contradictions 
between the tenets of Western political thought and the 
reality of imperial domination.
The idea of decolonization was developing and becoming a 
moral norm among the imperialist nations as well. By 1935 the 
only major argument remaining for retaining colonization was 
to allow time to nurture self-government among colonized 
peoples and to prevent chaos in the colonies.66 The turning 
point in the decolonization movement came in 1960 when forty- 
three African and Asian nations presented the Declaration on 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to 
the United Nations General Assembly. The declaration 
proclaimed that
(1) the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation is a denial of 
fundamental human rights;
(2) all peoples have the right to self-determination by
66 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign 
Policy, (Princeton, University Press, 1992), 120.
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virtue of which they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development;
(3) the "inadequacy of political, economic, social and 
educational preparedness" should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence;
(4) immediate steps should be taken, in trust and non­
self-governing territories, to transfer all powers 
to the peoples of those territories, without any 
conditions or reservations, in accordance with 
their freely expressed will and desire;
(5) any attempt aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and territorial 
integrity of a county is incompatible with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter.67
The United Nations General Assembly unanimously voted in favor 
of the declaration with ninety-three nations voting.
This declaration completed the reversal of colonization 
as an accepted practice in the twentieth century. During the 
1920s colonization was considered legitimate in the 
international system, by the end of World War II it could be 
justified only as a step on the road to self-governance, and 
finally in 1960 it was seen as intolerable. The United 
States, as the vanguard of the movement, had been openly 
critical of the overseas empires of its European allies. 
Nevertheless, the Panama Canal remained an indispensable 
symbol of American power.
67 Ibid., 121.
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Panama Frames the Problem
In Panama, at the turn of the century, it was the manner 
in which the U.S. took the Canal Zone that produced the 
political counterforce. This force probably would have grown 
even if the first practical expressions of Woodrow Wilson's 
principle of "self-determination" had not been signaling the 
beginning of the end of the great age of imperialism.
The gradual ascendancy of Panamanian middle class 
politics in the years after World War II fueled Panamanian 
nationalism. Opposition rose to the traditional ruling 
oligarchy and the special political and economic privileges 
that the United States enjoyed in the Canal Zone. The 
pressures were compounded with the sudden deterioration of 
economic conditions in Panama after 1945. Panama was no 
longer a favorite child of the U.S. and fewer of Latin 
America's products were needed after the war effort. As 
George Moffett writes, "Latin America was set adrift to cope 
with economic problems that almost overnight assumed prewar 
severity."68 By 1950 no Panamanian government would demand 
less than some tangible recognition of sovereignty over the 
Canal Zone.
National Guard Brigadier General Omar Torrijos came to 
power in Panama as a result of the country's first military 
coup in 1968. He was left-leaning and reform-minded and his
68 George D. Moffett III, The Limits of Victory, (Cornell 
University Press, 1985), 25.
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political base was anchored in the lower and middle classes. 
Torrijos saw the opportunity to take a new approach to the 
Canal Zone problem. He knew that military might was not the 
only powerful force in international relations. "To resolve 
a problem, the first thing you have to do is make it a 
problem," Torrijos said of his new approach.69 The problem of 
the Panama Canal was presented to the international community 
in hopes to build worldwide pressure against the United 
States.
In 1972, the United Nations Security Council held its 
first meeting with a regional theme in Addis Adaba to discuss 
problems of colonialism and security in Africa. Torrijos 
seized the opportunity to extend invitations to the Council to 
hold a meeting in Panama the following year. Many people saw 
Torrijos's plan in the making including the American 
ambassador to the UN, George Bush, but they couldn't divert 
it.
The offense started with opening remarks from Torrijos
which in part stated:
Panama understands full well the struggle of peoples that 
are suffering the humiliation of colonialism, of other 
peoples that, like us, are suffering restrictions and 
subjection, of those men that do not [sic] allow 
political power to be exercised by a foreign Government 
over the territory of their birth, of those generations
69 William J. Jordon, Panama Odyssey (University of Texas 
Press, 1984), 176.
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that are struggling and will continue to struggle to root 
out from their country the presence of foreign troops, 
placed there without the consent of the occupied 
nation....[For Panama], which seventy years ago opened 
its arms for the benefit of the merchant fleet of the 
world, it becomes extremely difficult to understand how 
a country whose hallmark has been not to be colonists 
insists on maintaining a colony in the very heart of my 
country. Surely for that people this must be a shame, 
since they were a colony and they knew how degrading it 
was to be so, and they struggled heroically to achieve 
their freedom. I say to the representatives of the 
United States that it is more noble to redress an 
injustice than to perpetuate an error. From the world 
which is represented here today we ask for moral support 
in this struggle engaged in by the weak. This struggle 
can triumph only when it is assisted by the conscience of 
the world, and our people is already reaching the limit 
of its patience.70
The speech led off six days of carefully orchestrated speeches 
and site visits for the fifteen member-nations that dramatized 
Panamanian dissatisfaction with the 1903 treaty. By the end 
of the session even long time allies of the U.S. including 
Australia, France, Kenya, and Canada were voting against the 
U.S. position in Panama.
The pressure that Torrijos and the international 
community were putting on the U.S. transformed the Canal Zone 
issue from a modest regional matter into a major global issue
70 Quoted in McElroy, 129 from Security Council, Official 
Records, March 1973, 1695th meeting, pp.1-3.
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and a priority for the U.S. Other factors also made the 
discussion of a new treaty possible, including the end of the 
U.S. focus on the Vietnam War and the growing economic 
benefits garnered by favorable relationships with Latin 
America.
It was Henry Kissinger, national security advisor and 
secretary of state under the Nixon administration, that 
convened a task force to deal with the Panamanian issue. 
Ellsworth Bunker was appointed to negotiate new principles for 
a treaty and the task was completed in 1974. Kissinger 
explained the motives behind the new position of the United 
States recognizing the interdependency of nations and the 
international consensus against a remnant of colonialism: "a 
stable world cannot be imposed by force; it must derive from 
consensus. Mankind can only achieve community on the basis of 
shared objectives.... In the past our negotiation would have 
been determined by relative strength. Today we have come 
together in an act of conciliation. We recognize that no 
agreement can endure unless the parties want to maintain it. 
Participation in partnership is far preferable to reluctant 
acquiescence."71 The principles reflected the conciliatory 
tone of Kissinger and indicated the serious intention of the 
United States to relinquish the positions held since 1903.
71 Margaret E. Scranton, "Changing United States Foreign 
Policy: Negotiating New Panama Canal Treaties, 1958-1978"
(Ph.D dis. University of Pittsburgh, 1980) quoted in Moffett, 
391.
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The agreement, known as the Kissinger-Tack agreement named 
after the American and the Panamanian foreign minister who 
negotiated it, provided that:
1. The treaty of 1903 and its amendments would be 
abrogated.
2. The concept of perpetuity would be eliminated.
3. There would be a termination of United States 
jurisdiction over Panamanian territory that would 
take place in accord with terms specified in the 
treaty.
4. The Panamanian territory in which the canal is 
situated would be returned to the jurisdiction of 
the Republic of Panama. The Republic of Panama, as 
territorial sovereign, would grant to the United 
States for the duration of the new canal treaty the 
right to use the lands, water, and airspace 
necessary to operate the canal.
5. The Republic of Panama would have a just and 
equitable share of the benefits derived from the 
operation of the canal.
6. The Republic of Panama would participate in the 
administration of the canal.
7. The Republic of Panama would participate with the 
United States in the protection and defense of the 
canal.72
Negotiator Ellsworth Bunker explained the negotiations 
attempted to "lay the foundations for a new, more modern 
relationship which will enlist Panamanian cooperation and
72 Congressional Research Service, Background Documents 
Relating to the Panama Canal (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1977), pp. 1478-1479, quoted in McElroy, p. 
132.
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better protect our interests."73 The interests Bunker was 
referring to here were the avoidance of conflict in Panama, 
improved international trade and reputational damage to the 
United States if United States continued to operate from a 
colonialist mentality.
The Carter Administration and the Move from Realism
The principles of the Kissinger-Tack agreement were 
developed within the prerogative of the executive branch and 
in an environment relatively free of the internal pressures of 
the Congress and the public. In order to secure a treaty, 
Senate ratification would have to be attained. This task was 
offered to Jimmy Carter's administration, which fully embraced 
it. The public and Congressional opposition to the 
conciliatory Canal Zone policies in the past paled to what the 
Carter administration was about to see. Later Carter would 
describe his Panama affair as "the most difficult political 
battle he had ever faced, including my long campaign for 
President."74 This section will show how a statesman can 
relate his or her moral values and public notions of common 
morality to the substance and style of their policies and 
actions.
In 1974, in direct response to the Kissinger-Tack
73 Quoted in Richard Hudson, "Storm over the Canal," New 
York Times Magazine, May 16, 1976, 79.
74 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith:Memoirs of a President (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1982), 152.
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Agreement, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina headed up 
thirty cosponsors for a Senate resolution urging that "the 
government of the United Sates should maintain and protect its 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Canal and Zone and 
should in no way cede, dilute, forfeit, negotiate or transfer 
any of these sovereign rights.,|75 Thurmond did the same in 
1975, this time rounding up thirty-seven sponsors, three more 
than necessary to defeat a treaty. Public opinion against 
relinquishing control over the Canal was also growing. A 
Gallup Poll taken in 1964 after rioting in Panama found that 
of the 64 percent of the population aware of the issue, 
opposition to relinquishing control over the canal was at 60%. 
Thirteen years later, on the eve of the ratification debate, 
public opposition weighed in at 78%.76 Diplomacy and domestic 
politics were on different courses and were about to collide 
within the Carter administration.
The Carter administration was shaped by the liberal 
internationalists with their tolerance of political diversity 
and respect for the forces of global change. A new, more 
diverse, less lucid form of international policy was forming 
and was the first successful rebellion against the principle 
of containment. John Spanier describes President Carter as 
"president of the only administration after 1945 that
75 George D. Moffett III, The Limits of Victory, (Cornell 
University Press, 1985), 42.
76 Ibid, 44.
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repudiated much of the traditional way of looking at 
international politics and to embrace a new vision of a more 
' interdependent' world.1,77
Containment professed a limited pie or zero-sum theory. 
Every piece of pie gained for world communism meant a loss for 
the U.S. Enough pieces of pie moving in the same direction 
would create a domino effect. Practice of this philosophy can 
make the distinction between central and peripheral issues 
difficult. For Carter, the policy represented a philosophy of 
international relations that eroded America's faith and 
prestige and produced the tragedy of the Vietnam War.
The willingness of the Carter Administration to return 
the Canal Zone to Panama indicated a change in U.S. - Latin 
American relationships. It demonstrated a new era of 
relationships based on equality and a move away from "big 
brother” paternalism. Carter moved away from the practice of 
containment in Panama for three reasons. The first was that 
Torrijos had convinced twelve Latin American countries to band 
together and express their views on the Panama Canal to 
President Carter. This convinced Carter that his approach to 
Panama not only involved the U.S. relationship with Panama but 
with all of Latin America and indeed all of the Third World. 
Carter chose not to invoke the deep animosities that continued
77 John Spanier quoted in Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter 
Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and their 
Impact on Behavior, (University of South Carolina Press, 
1987), 10.
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colonialism might instill. In his memoirs, Carter further 
explained that inaction on the part of the U.S. regarding 
Panama was "driving a wedge between us and some of our best 
friends and allies" by forcing them to take sides on the 
Panama issue.78
The threat of sabotage against the canal was the second 
reason why the administration moved toward a new treaty in 
Panama. The canal, a system of locks surrounded by jungles, 
provided an easy target for saboteurs. This fact was made 
very clear to many Senators during the ratification process 
with the use of helicopter rides over the Canal Zone. The 
U.S. may have been put in a position to defend the canal and 
the potential cost in human life and economic loss was 
estimated to be high on both sides.79 Carter decided that the 
best method of defending the Canal was not force but a 
"working partnership and good relationship with Panama."80
The third reason Carter chose the Panama Canal treaties 
as a center piece of his foreign-policy agenda was to show the 
role of morality in foreign policies. In June 1977, Carter 
outlined his idea of just and equitable foreign policies: "Our 
policy is based on a historical vision of America's role. Our
78 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 156.
79 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1983), 141.
80 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 155.
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policy is derived from a larger view of global change. Our 
policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our 
policy is reinforced by our material wealth and our military 
power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind.”81 Thus, 
Carter had moved U.S. politics from the principles of realism, 
power politics and cynicism to an attempt to correct 
injustices through an equitable foreign policy. This attempt 
was in large part successful in the Panama issue by an 
enormous education effort to inform Senators and the general 
public of the issues surrounding the Panama Canal.
The Carter administration continued negotiations with 
Panama to solidify a treaty based on the Kissinger-Tack 
principles. Actually two treaties were formed in August of 
1977. One, to expire in the year 2000, provided for the 
gradual full assumption by Panama of the management, operation 
and maintenance of the Canal (the Panama Canal Treaty); the 
other provided for the permanent neutrality of the Canal and 
for permanent U.S. rights to defend the Canal (the Neutrality 
Treaty).
The Internal Debate
The immediate plan to win approval for the new Canal 
treaties was to disperse administration speakers throughout 
the nation to explain why the treaties were needed. Their
81 Quoted in Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American 
Foreign Policy, (Princeton, University Press, 1992), 137.
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focus was broad and nationwide but their primary target was a 
select group of local and national opinion leaders. Although 
the administration knew they faced an uphill battle, they 
maintained that the reason that most Americans were against 
the release of the Canal Zone was that they were not fully 
informed of the issue. The eight month campaign was kicked 
off with a grandiose, faultlessly orchestrated "Panama Week" 
in the nation's capitol. During the next few months, speaking 
engagements were given the highest priority in states where at 
least one senator's vote was undecided on the issue. Key to 
their campaign were community leaders, attorneys, business 
people, state officials, civic and religious leaders, 
educators and publishers. The media blitz took on the 
dimensions of a presidential campaign. Handled by the 
Department of State's Office of Public Affairs, there were 
over fifteen hundred separate "events" encouraging the 
ratification of the treaties, an effort unprecedented in size 
and scope in the department's history.82 The President 
himself, with other high-prestige salesmen, held ten sessions 
for opinion leaders from thirty states. Few who attended the 
sessions left unconvinced.
In the Congress, the administration practiced 
accomodationist policies in addition to the information 
offensive. Included in these tactics was an adequate supply
82 George D. Moffett III, The Limits of Victory, (Cornell 
University Press, 1985), 80.
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of defensive information to combat arguments against the 
treaties and political cover necessary to make the vote for 
ratification as easy and free of cost as possible.
The debate over the Panama Canal Treaties in the Senate 
represents an example of Stone's analysis-as-argument 
(presented in Chapter 2) and portrays the complex situations 
that political leaders must sort through. Former Governor 
Ronald Reagan was the mainstay of the effort against the 
treaties. The opposition argued the treaties were illegal, 
unpatriotic, a cowardly yielding to black-mail, a boon to 
communism, and a threat to U.S. security. The debate over the 
Panama Canal Treaties centered around efforts to interpret 
history and to predict the future. The former effort 
consisted of debates over the issue of sovereignty in the 
canal zone and the issue of ethics. The attempt to predict 
the future focused on the economic debate and national 
security issues.
Opponents of the treaties argued that the U.S. had 
sovereign rights in the Canal Zone and took evidence from 
former treaties and judicial decisions. Citing the original 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty, they observed that the 1903 treaty 
granted the U.S. all sovereign rights in the Canal Zone "to 
the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama 
of any such sovereign rights, power or authority." Ronald 
Reagan argued that not only did the U.S. have sovereign rights 
over the Canal Zone but they owned real estate. In addition
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to the $10 million the U.S. had paid for sovereignty, the U.S. 
paid almost $160 million for public and private land. To 
bolster their case, opponents insisted that treaty revisions 
of 1936 and 1955 reaffirmed the original grant of sovereignty. 
They also cited a 1907 Supreme Court case of Wilson v. Shaw 
that recognized "the Canal Zone as official territory of the 
United States." In short, opponents of the treaties made the 
case that relinquishing the Panama Canal would be like 
returning Alaska to the Russians or the Louisiana Purchase to 
the French.
Proponents of the treaties denied that the question of 
sovereignty was significant in the debate and did little more 
than resurrect old grievances or reopen old wounds. When 
forced to address the sovereignty issue, they cited a list of 
actions suggesting that the Canal Zone was something other 
than a U.S. territory. They noted that children born to non- 
Americans in the Canal Zone were not considered U.S. citizens 
as they would have been in a sovereign American territory. 
They submitted that goods coming from the Canal Zone passed 
through customs like those from foreign countries, and finally 
they noted that U.S. mail service considered the ports within 
the Canal Zone as foreign ports. Proponents also had their 
share of court cases that stated the U.S. did not have 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone. They also cited Wilson v. 
Shaw that called the Canal Zone a U.S. territory only for the 
limited, specific purpose of expending funds for construction.
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Proponents of the treaties strongest case probably revolved 
around the regular payments to Panama, citing the similarity 
to paying rent the way a building owner would make lease 
payments to a landowner.
If the opponents of the treaties enjoyed an advantage 
when interpreting history in light of treaties written, they 
were back-pedalling in the moral clashes. Opponents had to 
answer charges that the United States had stolen the canal 
with an unfair agreement. They argued that the U.S. had 
little to do with the independence of Panama from Columbia and 
that the original treaty was ratified by the Panamanian 
government which was composed of only Panamanians. Proponents 
hinted at colonialism with the risk of the American public 
taking offense, by imagining that the French retained a five- 
mile zone along the Mississippi River following the Louisiana 
Purchase.
While there was much debate on how to interpret the 
history surrounding the Panama Canal, there was an equal 
amount of debate attempting to predict the future. Treaty 
opponents claimed that the American taxpayer will be required 
to pay millions of dollars, perhaps billions, in loans, aid, 
additional shipping costs, depressed farm prices, and loss of 
jobs if the treaties were approved. Those in favor of the 
treaties calculated that any payments to Panama would come 
from tolls paid by ships using the canal and that there would 
be no payment of tax dollars to Panama at any time.
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The remaining aspect of the Panama Canal Treaty debate 
was concerned with America's security and military interests. 
The opponents and proponents of the treaties both emphasized 
these issues over all others in the debate. Both considered 
the Canal primarily a strategic rather than a commercial 
asset. The opponents of the treaties theorized that U.S. 
security depended upon the control of that sea route and 
without it America's freedom was in jeopardy. A point of 
contention was the canal's usefulness with large warships. 
Opponents noted a trend in shipbuilding toward smaller ships 
that would be able to use the canal; proponents saw no such 
trend. The Carter Administration argued that the new treaties 
would best assure America's continued use of the canal, citing 
how vulnerable it was to assault or sabotage by the 
Panamanians. Approving the treaties would reduce the chances 
of sabotage by giving the Panamanians a stake in the canal. 
In other words, the security of the canal did not rest on 
American power but the absence of hostility and support of the 
Panamanian population. Opponents of the treaties saw limited 
potential for cooperation between the Panamanians and the U.S.
There were many offshoots of these arguments such as 
those regarding the meaning of neutrality, or the American 
role in the defense of the canal, but all were under the 
rubric of national interest. Many senators needed to force 
the administration into some kind of compromise before they 
could justify a vote in favor of ratification. These
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alterations centered on credit sharing and U.S. military 
intervention in the Canal Zone during labor strikes and other 
problems.
Many senators were torn on the issue. One such senator 
was Republican Henry Bellmon from Oklahoma. Bellmon wrote two 
speeches addressing the treaties; one supportive and one in 
opposition. He felt his argument against the treaties was 
hypocritical and finally voted in favor of the treaties. For 
Democrat Russell Long of Louisiana the choice was easy. "It is 
satisfying to be powerful," hes said. "It is nice to be rich. 
We can cling to the past and the gunboat diplomacy it 
represents, or we can provide the leadership that this world 
must have if the hopes and prayers of mankind are to 
prevail.1,83
A surprising convert to the proponents of the treaties 
was Republican Minority Leader Howard Baker. Facing a re- 
election and a showdown with Senator Robert Dole for GOP right 
wing leadership, he had everything to lose by coming out in 
favor of the treaties. But after a visit with Omar Torrijos 
in Panama, Baker joined fifteen of his 38 colleagues endorsing 
the pact.
Months into the second longest treaty debate in the 
history of the Senate, the administration had only forty-eight
83 Quoted in "Panama: A Big Win" Newsweek, March 27, 1978,
45.
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of the sixty-seven votes needed for ratification.84 It became 
clear that some Senators wanted more. Most concessions were 
non-treaty related. The administration dropped its long­
standing opposition to a $2.3 billion emergency farm bill 
sought by Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia which would pay 
farmers for not growing crops on 31 million acres of land. 
The United States agreed to purchase $250 million worth of 
Arizona copper. Senators received audiences with the 
president on many issues, mostly with favorable results. In 
other words, Carter, "the aloof and didactic technocrat had 
been forced to demonstrate that he could scratch and bargain 
for votes like any other mortal politician."85
In the end, the administration was finally able to come 
up with the votes necessary for ratification of the two 
treaties with one to spare. The U.S. Senate voted in favor of 
the Neutrality Treaty on March 16, 1987 and the Panama Canal 
Treaty on April 18. The resolutions were passed by the same 
margin, 68 to 32, and with the same supporters and opponents. 
Fifty-two Democrats with sixteen Republicans voted in favor of 
the treaties. Ten Democrats and twenty-two Republicans voted 
in opposition. There were many reasons for the
accomplishment; bipartisan elite support, political horse 
trading, and sympathy, among many undecided Senators, for a
84 Only the Treaty of Versailles took more time.
85 "Panama: A Big Win," Newsweek, 27 March 1978, 42.
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new president who took on a difficult task and who would be 
politically crippled if defeated on issue so early in his 
presidency.
Analysis and Implications
The case study provides ample evidence that in the 
twentieth century, it is possible for statesmen to make a 
difference in international affairs even in the context of 
massive political forces and the limits that such forces place 
on their freedom of action. Statesmen can and do make 
individual choices that provide opportunities for affecting 
large number of lives in significant ways. This capacity to 
choose, to discern and seize opportunities, is one of the 
marks of a great leader. The concept of prudence is integral 
to the relationship of morality and politics. Prudence calls 
for moral principles to be translated into actual policies 
through the mediation of a complex process in which decisions 
makers must consummate the process with specific acts.
The case study also shows a portrait of Jimmy Carter as 
a prudent statesman. He had a sharp sense of his limits and 
was willing to compromise selectively in order to advance his 
larger political purposes. These purposes were, in turn, 
shaped by profoundly moral concerns. His policies were rooted 
in a normative vision with a strong belief in traditional 
social and moral virtues and the role of the state as a 
nurturer of these. Carter recognized the that a balance
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between ideals and practice must be met, as explained in the
following excerpt of a speech:
Ours is a great and powerful nation, committed to certain 
enduring ideals, and those ideals must be reflected... in 
our foreign policy. There are practical, effective ways 
in which our power can be used to alleviate human 
suffering around the world. We should begin by having it 
understood that if any nation... deprives its own people 
of basic human rights, that fact will help shape our own 
people's attitude toward that nation's repressive 
government.... Now we must be realistic... we do not and 
should not insist on identical standards.... We can live 
with diversity in governmental systems, but we cannot 
look away when a government tortures people or jails them 
for their beliefs.86
Carter's accomplishment of getting the Panama Canal 
Treaties approved by the U.S. Senate was astonishing. He 
tapped the American people's emotions with arguments that were 
morally elevated. He grasped that America's instinctive 
ownership of the Canal could be overcome only by an appeal to 
its belief in the exceptional nature of its ideals. While 
many may disagree with Carter's decision, it is hard to deny 
that he had a capacity of articulating a normative vision for 
the U.S. in the world, joined with a large amount of practical 
wisdom in pursuit of that vision. When faced with difficult 
decisions, he was animated by a moral purpose that did not
86 Jimmy Carter speech quoted in Robert A. Pastor, 
Whirlpool U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the 
Caribbean, (Princeton University Press, 1992), 44.
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degenerate into moralism and a framework of powerful ideas 
that should not be confused with ideology.
In this era of increasing democratization and growing 
influence of public opinion on foreign policy, I suspect that 
prudence will acquire vast practical influence rivaling that 
of traditional realism. Today states operate in an 
international system in which power is more widely diffused 
than it was when Morgenthau's realism dominated international 
relations theory. Both realism and internationalism suffer 
from the tendency to overestimate one's capabilities coupled 
with a refusal to recognize limits. Thus, even the goal of 
enlarging democracy must be pursued with moderation in 
conjunction with an awareness of geopolitical and strategic 
considerations.
An essential element of prudence is an interplay between 
realpolitik and a higher idealism animated by religion, 
ideology, or morality. The practice of pure realism is not 
possible by the United States or any other state because no 
one country can dominate the world so thoroughly. Prudence is 
not, however, an overestimation of human goodness with utopian 
delusions nor is it a brew of neopacifism with a reliance on 
collective security and international law that is vulnerable 
to aggression. The American public would not support 
promotion of pure idealism once they understood all of the 
required corollary commitments and involvements. The prudent 
statesman must strike a balance between the moral and the
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strategic elements of American foreign policy. This balance 
cannot be prescribed in the abstract. The genesis of prudence 
is the recognition that a balance needs to be struck.
CHAPTERS
CONCLUSION
This thesis examined the two major schools of thought on 
international relations. The realist approach regards 
involvement in power politics as an inevitable part of a 
successful international strategy. The utopian approach 
expects a more cooperative attitude among states because of 
their interdependency. The national interest, what both 
schools claim to have as a goal, is an amorphous concept 
composed of interests and values, with political leaders 
assigning a priority to these interests and determining 
methods of implementation. There is no single answer or model 
that encompasses the issues or ideas of national interest and 
how to attain it. Rather, 'national interest' is a concept 
whose meaning is indeterminate, disputed, with its own dynamic 
and requires some intellectual and moral virtues. It depends 
largely on the character of the definer and is used as a 
foundation to build support for a particular program. The 
individual political leader must interpret history, weigh 
arguments, and predict the future. Since this is accomplished 
in a political environment, national interest is also 
politically defined. In the international arena, the 
political process operates on two levels; external and 
internal politics. The case study of the Panama Canal 
Treaties showed the complexity of international relations and
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examples of the issues that political leaders must face. In 
this thesis, I have attempted to show that to align oneself 
solely with ideals or a cynical description of the nature of 
mankind would not prove useful. Skills needed to accomplish 
the delicate task of administering international relations 
were defined by Aristotle over 2,000 years ago. These skills, 
the ability to deliberate, to understand and to consider, are 
part of the tradition of normative prudence that bridges the 
world of morality and politics. Prudence allows the political 
leader to pursue and achieve moral objectives in the political 
world even if the objectives themselves have to be redefined 
in the political process.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. H. Rackhaxn. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964.
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New 
York: Bantam Books, 1982.
Clinton, W. David. "Politics and the National Interest: The 
Two Conversations." Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy. 
Ed. W. David Clinton. University Press of America, 1988.
Coll, Alberto R. "Normative Prudence as a Tradition of 
Statecraft." Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 5 
(1991): 33-51.
Coll, Alberto R. "Prudent Statesmen: Kissinger, Truman, and 
Thatcher." Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 9 
(1995): 193-213.
Craig, Gordon. "Looking for Order." Review of Diplomacy, 
by Henry Kissinger. The New York Review, May 12, 1994: 
8-14.
Edel, Abraham, et al. Morality, Philosophy, and Practice.
New York: Random House, 1989.
Garrett, Stephen A. "Political Leadership and the Problem 
of Dirty Hands." Ethics and International Affairs,
Volume 8 (1994): 159-75.
Gilpin, Robert G. "The Richness of the Tradition of 
Political Realism." Neorealism and its Critics. Ed. Jane 
J. Mansbridge. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1990.
Gray, Colin S. "Force, Order, and Justice: The Ethics of 
Realism." Global Affairs, Summer Issue 1993: 1-17.
Hogan, Michael J. The Panama Canal in American Politics.
Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.
Hudson, Richard. "Storm over the Canal," New York Times 
Magazine, May 16, 1976.
Johnson, Mark. Moral Imagination. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1993.
91
92
Jordon, William J. Panama Odyssey. University of Texas 
Press,1984.
Joynt, Carey B. and Corbett Percy E. Theory and Reality in 
World Politics. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978.
Kant, Immanuel. "Eternal Peace." Reprinted in Carl Joachim 
Friedrich. Inevitable Peace. New York: Greenwood Press, 
1948.
Kaufman, Robert G. "Morality and World Affairs, Avoiding 
Utopianism." Strategic Review, Spring 1992: 31-37.
Keohane, Robert 0. "Empathy and International Regimes", 
Beyond Self-interest. Ed. Jane Mansbridge. Chicago: The 
University Press, 1990.
Kingdon, John W. "Politicians, Self-Interest, and Ideas."
Reconsidering the Democratic Public. Eds. George Marcus 
and Russel Hanson. Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1993.
Kishlansky, Mark A. "The Emergence of Adversary Politics in 
the Long Parliament." Journal of Modern History 49: 617- 
40.
Knutsen, Torbjorn L. A History of International Relations 
Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
Lappe, Frances Moore. Rediscovering America's Values. New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1989.
Lerner, Ralph. The Thinking Revolutionary. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987.
Mansbridge, Jane J. "Self-interest in the Explanation of 
Political Life," Beyond Self Interest. Ed. Jane J. 
Mansbridge. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1990.
McCullough, David. The Path between the Seas. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1977.
McElroy, Robert W. Morality and Foreign Policy. Princeton 
University Press, 1992.
Moffett III, George. The Limits of Victory. Cornell 
University Press, 1985.
93
Morgenthau, Hans J. "Human Rights and Foreign Policy."
Herbert Butterfield: The Ethics of History and Politics. 
Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson. University Press of America, 
1980.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations. New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1973.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human 
Nature. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1949.
Oppenheim, Felix E. "National Interest, Rationality, and
Morality" Political Theory (August 1987): 369-86.
Oppenheim, Felix E. The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy 
Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991.
Pastor, Robert. Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992.
Plato. The Republic. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. New York: 
Airmont, 1986.
Rein, Martin. "Value-Critical Policy Analysis." Ethics, 
the Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis. Eds. Daniel 
Callahan and Bruce Jenning. Plenum Press, 1983.
Rosati, Jerel A. The Carter Administration's quest for 
Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on Behavior. 
University of South Carolina Press, 1987.
Rosenthal, Joel H. Righteous Realists. Louisiana State 
University Press, 1991.
Schlesinger, James. "The New World Order, A Plea for 
Realism." Foreign Policy, No. 85, Winter 1991-92: 3-24.
Sherman, Nancy. The Fabric of Character, Aristotle's
Theory of Virtue. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
Solomon, Robert C. Ethics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984.
Stone, Deborah A. Policy Paradox and Political Reason. 
Scott, Froesman and Company, 1988.
Thompson, Kenneth W. Morality and Foreign Policy. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1980.
Tong, Rosemarie. Ethics in Policy Analysis. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986.
94
Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1983.
Weber, Max "Politics as a Vocation." From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology. Eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1958.
Wiarda, Howard J. In Search of Policy, The United States 
and Latin America. Washington: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984.
